


JPRS-TAC-93-003
25 February 1993



JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-93-003

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Signing of START II Called 'Welcome Step'

OW1202111093 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
Nos 3-4, 18-31 Jan 93 p 14

[Article by Zhou Qingchang: "START II Signed—A Welcome Step"]

[Text] After month-long negotiations, the United States and the Russian Federation reached an agreement on a new nuclear reduction treaty. U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) in the Kremlin on January 3, 1993. Public opinion notes this as a diplomatic achievement made by Bush before leaving office.

The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed by President of the former USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and Bush in Moscow, on July 31, 1991. The treaty stipulates that the two countries would each cut their warheads on the three types of strategic weapons—land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers—from more than 10,000 to 6,000. However, both countries actually have in their possession a number of warheads beyond the stipulated quota because of particular provisions of the treaty. The United States has 8,500 warheads and the Soviet Union has 6,500. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia carried out its treaty commitments. Meanwhile, the United States reached protocol on the treaty with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan pledged to remove the former Soviet strategic weapons on their territories. The legislatures of the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan (but not of Ukraine and Belarus) have ratified the treaty.

START II was put on the agenda early last year. On January 28 and 29, 1992 Bush and Yeltsin each issued initiatives on further nuclear reductions. They reached an agreement in principle while meeting in Washington on June 16, 1992. They decided that in the 11 years before the year 2003 the total number of strategic warheads would be reduced to 3,000-3,500 on each side in two phases. They also agreed that by 2003 all the land-based missiles with multiple warheads held by their respective countries would be eliminated.

From the viewpoint of arms control, the salient feature of this new treaty is that the scale of reduction is far beyond that stipulated in previous nuclear reduction treaties or plans. START I requires cuts of 25 percent to 35 percent in

strategic warheads. START II obliges the two nations to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds within 10 years and eliminate all intercontinental land based multiple-warhead missiles; this greatly reduces the danger of a first nuclear strike. Even so, the United States and Russia still control the majority of nuclear weapons and they can use their missile warheads to destroy each other.

In comparison with past arms control negotiations, the time for START II negotiations was short (about a year). This reflected a change in U.S.-Russian relations. The two sides attempted to set up relations of trust and cooperation and did not take the other side as the enemy. Therefore, their nuclear strategies have altered correspondingly. Russia has not only changed its traditional policy of nuclear arms race, but it strives to reduce its arms and military expenditure in order to alleviate economic difficulties. The United States, unlike in the period of the Cold War when it took the USSR as the target of a massive nuclear strike, began to selectively reduce its nuclear arsenals so as to mitigate its defense burden.

Both Bush and Yeltsin hailed the START II treaty as a historic document. Yeltsin said it had opened a new era for U.S.-Russian relations as well as for the whole world. Bush said that the treaty signified the end of the Cold War and that the United States and Russia had become partners instead of rivals.

But a basic fact persists: even if the two countries succeeded in implementing the START II treaty, Russia and the United States would still remain the largest nuclear powers with their nuclear armaments kept at the levels of the 1970s and the 1960s respectively.

Moreover, there are now people in both countries who oppose the treaty. They may try to block its ratification by the legislature. In addition, implementation of this treaty would rely heavily on Ukraine's position. Ukraine's parliament has not yet ratified the START I treaty, arguing that the document does not reflect the interests of Ukraine and demanding that its security be guaranteed before it complies.

Last but not least, to destroy nuclear weapons needs a large sum of money. For Russia, with its economy in disarray, this is a hard nut to crack.

But, however difficult it might be, the international community expects to see the two sides abide by the treaty faithfully.

SOUTH KOREA

Chemical Weapons Treaty To Be Ratified in 2 Years

SK1502014093 Seoul YONHAP in English
0047 GMT 15 Feb 93

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 15 (YONHAP)—Seoul will ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) within 2 years, regardless of whether Pyongyang joins the treaty, officials forecast Monday.

Korea's next government would not designate a separate national authority to prepare for ratification, but would instead put the Trade and Industry Ministry in charge of charting budget and manpower requirements, they predicted. Between 20 and 30 Korean chemical companies are likely to come under inspection once the CWC goes into effect around early 1995.

South Korea joined the convention when it opened for signatures last month. North Korea, believed to have built up an advanced chemical weapons capability, is yet to sign the convention.

"There were calls to link Pyongyang's joining of CWC with Seoul's ratification of the convention. But because of CWC's domestic impact, we plan to go ahead with ratification as soon as we are ready in order to protect precision chemical industry," an official said.

The convention vows to destroy all existing chemical weapons within 10 years and has the most stringent inspection measures to monitor global transfer of weapons-grade chemicals.

The official pointed out that South Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) before North Korea as well.

"We will urge Pyongyang to sign the CWC as part of inter-Korean confidence-building measures when we resume the prime ministerial talks," he said. He predicted that the incoming government would introduce laws requiring regular reports on chemical productions and import and export of sensitive materials at the time of ratification.

ISRAEL

Egypt Wants Separate Arms Control Talks

TA0502115193 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
5 Feb 93 p A1

[Report by defense correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpt] Egypt has approached Israel with a proposal to hold arms control talks outside the framework of the multilateral negotiations. The Egyptians wish to discuss the details of the Israeli Government's arms control initiative, which was presented by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres last

month. The Defense and Foreign Ministries are now discussing their reply to the Egyptian proposal.

The Israeli initiative, which was drafted in preparation for the multilateral talks, comprises a proposal for Middle East demilitarization of surface-to-surface missiles and of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and a willingness to discuss all the components of military power and the regional arms race after stable peace arrangements are achieved. The guiding principle of Israel's initiative is reciprocal supervision of the implementation of commitments to curb armament. Also, Israel is ready to introduce reciprocal surprise checks in the event of suspected agreement violations. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

Ukrainian Ambitions' Impact on START, CFE Viewed

PM0502154593 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian
No 5, Jan 93 (signed to press 26 Jan 93) pp 8-10

[Arkadiy Moshes commentary: "Nuclear Policy of a Non-Nuclear Country. Major New Military Power Has Appeared Alongside Russia"]

[Text] In less than 18 months Ukraine has succeeded in setting up its own Armed Forces, which are significantly larger than those of other former Soviet republics.

Ukraine is potentially the world's third largest nuclear power, and will remain such until the end of the millennium, if not forever.

The 276 strategic missile launchers stationed in the republic (over 1,200 nuclear warheads) and the several hundred nuclear charges for aircraft are too much of a temptation for politicians easily to let go of this arsenal.

The quantity of conventional weapons belonging to Ukraine (see table) now also determines to a considerable extent the regional balance of power in Eastern Europe. And if you take into account the quality of arms and the combat readiness of troops, which were traditionally higher in western districts of the USSR, Ukraine's status as a leading military power in the region becomes obvious. By way of a comparison, we have taken the CSFR (before the split) and the FRG—the states in East and West Europe which possess the greatest quantity of conventional weapons.

Column one shows the situation as of 1 August 1992 for Ukraine, and as of 10 January 1989 for the CSFR and FRG.

Column two shows the ceilings established by the CFE Treaty.

	Ukraine		CSFR		FRG	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
Tanks	6,318	4,080	4,585	1,435	4,900	4,100
Armored Vehicles	7,689	5,050	4,900	2,050	6,840	3,440
Artillery	3,852	4,040	3,445	1,262	3,190	2,700
Aircraft	1,494	1,090	407	345	850	900
Helicopters	229	330	101	73	450	300

Kiev did not accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor did it ratify START I, and it is not obliged to comply with decisions adopted within the CIS framework. A situation is emerging where the state is free to conduct what is in practice a totally unrestricted policy in the military sphere.

The existing situation cannot be ignored any longer. It is vital to embark on serious military-political research and to elaborate a plan of action for Russia in respect of Ukraine.

Nuclear Lobby in Parliament

Treaties must be observed. But international law is not so strict on promises. This may be why official Kiev, which is

spending so much time on assurances regarding its commitment to nuclear-free principles, has in fact fulfilled not a single one of its promises.

Throughout the whole of last year various political forces successfully indoctrinated public opinion in favor of abandoning nuclear-free principles.

A powerful pro-nuclear lobby consisting of some top generals and nationalist party representatives has emerged in parliament. These deputies simply repudiate statements by the state's leaders. Thus General V. Tolubko, a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense Questions who at one time proposed elaborating a system for a defensive nuclear shield for Ukraine, declared when in Washington in September: "Ukraine will not necessarily abide by the dates and commitments enshrined in the Lisbon Protocol" (the protocol about Ukraine's accession to START I).

The idea of keeping nuclear weapons as a deterrent is shared by Supreme Soviet Chairman I. Plyushch. S. Khmara, an influential opposition leader, has repeatedly spoken in the name of deputies who believe that Ukraine should remain a nuclear power. Flexing its muscle, last April parliament adopted a special resolution in support of President Leonid Kravchuk's decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, and in October it refused to approve the military doctrine, which was based on nuclear-free principles.

Ukraine's official position is also evolving under the influence of the lobbyists. In January last year it was promised to make Ukraine a nuclear-free state by 1994. In March the deadline was moved back roughly a year. Now no dates are mentioned at all, on the grounds that nothing is said about this in the 1990 Declaration on State Sovereignty.

Kiev is demanding security guarantees in exchange for voluntarily abandoning nuclear weapons. The problem of guarantees is complex in itself (guarantees from whom, against whom?) and, combined with the question of compensation (Ukraine is hoping for \$1.2 billion at a time when the United States is prepared to offer just \$175 million in all), could mean that the question of nuclear disarmament altogether quits the realm of practical politics.

Will Washington Lean on Kiev?

By edict of Kravchuk, all groupings of strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine have been included in the country's Armed Forces. A Center for the Administrative Management of Troops of Strategic Nuclear Forces has been set up. Separate rocket and space troops are being formed. It is hard to believe that such measures help to implement nuclear-free principles.

Is it advantageous for Ukraine to keep its nuclear potential?

This is a rhetorical question—it is advantageous for any state to sit at the "top table" and ensure its national security at minimum cost (between 7 and 12 percent of states' military budgets are spent maintaining the world's nuclear forces). Ukraine is in a position to service its nuclear arsenals—there is sufficient industrial might and there are

enough trained personnel. The only problem concerns testing: Ukraine has no test ranges of its own.

Even leaving aside the possibility of the accession to power of a nationalist government not bound by any international commitments, the very fact of the appearance of a sixth nuclear power may prompt a chain reaction (how will Kazakhstan, India, or Pakistan behave?) and undermine the existing system of control over nuclear weapons.

In order to prevent this, the time has come for the world to stop turning a blind eye to obvious things and to demand an answer from Ukraine to the question of its nuclear future. And then to develop a policy concerning this country accordingly.

If the state is prepared to become nuclear-free, then we must agree in the process of multilateral talks on concrete deadlines for fulfilling obligations, the amount of international aid, the future use of fissionable materials, and also strict monitoring and verification measures. Unfortunately, in this respect START II is not a very useful document.

The results of the mid-January meeting between Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk, despite its obvious concentration on economic questions, may become a starting point for the negotiating process and end the existing tendency for Kiev and Moscow to carefully avoid discussing the problems of disarmament.

A continuation of the policy of procrastination must be perceived as proof of Ukraine's desire to become a nuclear state, and other mechanisms must be brought into operation.

I would not like to use the word "pressure" when describing the possible development of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. However, circumstances require that states truly involved in the process of nuclear disarmament, and above all the United States, which has effectively assumed the task of regularly putting Ukraine back "on the right road" (after all, it was under U.S. influence that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia resumed; it was Secretary of State J. Baker who secured Ukraine's signature of the Lisbon Protocol; and it is now Washington, not Moscow, that is making every effort to explain to Kiev the need to participate in the START process), occupy a firm, uncompromising position. To give way on questions of principle is effectively to submit to nuclear blackmail.

Military Alliance With Russia? No!

Judging from the excerpts of the Russian draft treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries leaked to the press in October, Moscow was insisting on preserving a unified strategic area on the territory of the two countries—that is, was regarding Ukraine's relations with Russia as an alliance.

There are serious doubts as to the correctness of such an approach, and Ukraine's rejection of the draft treaty is added confirmation of this. In purely theoretical terms, it is more advantageous for Ukraine to draw closer to East European countries and to become the center of gravity in the region than to turn toward Russia and preserve the status of being "eternally in second place." Kiev is well

aware of this. Last year Ukraine was extremely active in organizing military cooperation with its neighbors: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria. It is not impossible that Ukraine's idea for a Baltic-Black Sea area will entail the establishment of military relations of varying intensity.

East European countries, in their turn, are interested in military cooperation with Kiev for military-technical reasons: Ukrainian plants can supply their spare parts and ammunition and update their combat vehicle stocks.

Kiev has declared its neutrality and its nonalignment with blocs, which allegedly prevented the country from joining CIS military structures. But the state's military doctrine, now in preparation, will allow Ukraine to join coalitions against a specific enemy.

Discussion of the question of enemies is quite a delicate matter, for Ukraine has no specific enemy. The draft military doctrine sees any state making territorial claims against Ukraine as a potential enemy. Unfortunately, there can still be only one interpretation of the allusion.

The Ukrainian Republican Party and the Ukrainian National Assembly have already put forward the thesis of the "Eastern threat," and the latter has called directly for the creation of an anti-Russian alliance composed of the Baltic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

In this context efforts to blame Russia for disorder inside Ukraine continue to leave a bad taste in the mouth. The introduction of coupons, for instance, was explained by the claim that Russia had not supplied cash, and price liberalization was attributed to the increased cost of Russian oil.

For various reasons, Russia could find itself drawn into confrontation, fraught with the danger of an arms race, with Ukraine, toward which the Eastern Europe states would gravitate.

A scenario like this would be a tragedy which can still be avoided. To do this, Russia must first abandon all hope of a military alliance with Ukraine, removing all grounds to speak of a revival of imperialism. Second, and more importantly, a regional East European policy must be vigorously activated. The region's countries need cooperation with Russia, both for arms production and for conversion. The lack of common borders means the former allies have less reason to fear Moscow's interference. The withdrawal of Russian troops has already led to a slogan: "No occupation, no occupiers!"—this testifies to a turn in public opinion toward Russia.

Give Kiev the Fleet...

"Ukraine is a maritime power and should have its own Navy"—nobody will openly argue with this thesis of Kiev's politicians. Nevertheless, Ukraine's naval policy, for wholly understandable reasons, is virtually nonexistent.

The naval forces, which according to the plan are to include 100 ships and 40,000 personnel, which are intended to defend the state's coastline, to ensure the security of the economic zone, and to maintain a favorable operational regime in the region and to be capable even temporarily of

going outside the Black Sea, at present consist of two ships—the flagship Slavutich, and the “mutinous” SKR-112.

They are overshadowed by the looming presence of the Black Sea Fleet alongside—the object of Kiev’s dreams—which further complicates relations between Russia and Ukraine but which cannot be divided up before 1995. The Yalta agreement, which has been broken, incidentally, on a number of important points, means in reality that Russia currently provides the Black Sea Fleet with 96 percent of its weapons and ammunition, 98 percent of the resources for engineer munitions and equipment, 85 percent of fuels and lubricants, and so on. The Fleet, which is not Russian, continues to be financed from our budget.

The Fleet’s physical deterioration through wear and tear, now obvious, makes it increasingly costly to maintain, and the aims driving Russia to stubbornly cling onto the Fleet (after the departure from the Mediterranean and the reduction in Russia’s shoreline) are not clear. After all, Russia’s other fleets require increasing attention.

The moratorium on dividing up the Fleet until 1995 means merely delaying the solution to the problem and wasting vital time. I think it would be to the advantage of Russia, not Ukraine, to find a radical way out of the existing situation, such as dividing up the Black Sea Fleet.

Russia is quite able to accept the conditions proposed by Ukraine and to yield a sizable part of the Fleet to it. In exchange, we must try to acquire the right to use bases in the Crimea (important ones like the Kerch-Feodosiya test base, for instance). As a result, Ukraine will get what it requires for its own self-respect.

And Russia, having rid itself of the need to maintain old ships, will be able to implement a program for constructing some modern, economical destroyers and small ships more suited to carrying out patrol duty, and transfer to them the proportion of the personnel wishing to serve under the Russian flag. At the same time, one of the most powerful anti-Russian cards will be knocked out of the hands of Ukraine’s nationalists.

The Black Sea tangle is not a military problem. Preserving it, like solving it, changes nothing in the description of Ukraine as the major military power of Eastern Europe and potentially a nuclear power. It is already clear that it would be an unforgivable mistake to ignore the emergence of a new center of power in the region.

Belarusian Defense Official on Military Capabilities

*OW1202060693 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1600 GMT 11 Feb 93*

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Pyotr Chaus by correspondent Marina Chernukha; place and date not given—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] After the collapse of the USSR, all of its former republics declared their intent to establish their own armed forces. Today, they are at different levels of military readiness. In this respect, Belarus has progressed further than

many of the other former Soviet republics. Interfax correspondent Marina Chernukha sought more detailed information in an interview with Belarusian Deputy Defense Minister Petr Chaus.

IF [INTERFAX]: Belarus is coming close to establishing its own armed forces. How is the process going along?

CHAUS: The first thing was to create the necessary legal foundation. Parliament passed a group of laws creating the judicial basis for the establishment of the republic’s armed forces. In particular, laws were passed on the armed forces, defense, the social support of servicemen, the order of military service, and military pensions. There is no such legislation in any other country in the CIS. It not only guaranteed the legal basis for military preparation, but also and particularly importantly, gave Belarusian servicemen social and psychological assurances.

IF: What is the current situation in the division of the Soviet Union’s military property?

CHAUS: There is currently a large number of servicemen and military equipment in the republic, since the Belarusian military command was one of the most important in the USSR. We have armored groups, missile forces, ground troops, and antiaircraft units. All of these formations were subordinated to the Soviet defense ministry and its commanders in Moscow, and Belarus had not connections to them whatsoever. They have now been placed at the disposal of the Belarusian defense ministry.

There have been negotiations with the Russian defense ministry and the Supreme Command of the United Armed Forces of the CIS, but one has to admit that they were not easy. This was primarily because in our view, there were too many auxiliary units attached to strategic nuclear forces and thereby withdrawn from the disposal of the Belarusian ministry of defense. For instance, they tried to convince us that paratroops should be considered strategic. Such an expansion of the way “strategic forces” is understood was dangerous to the state’s sovereignty. And this is not just our own position. The same opinion is held by other CIS countries, in particular by Ukraine and Moldova.

Now, according to an arrangement reached in Minsk, the same strategic forces have considerably fewer units attached to them than before. This suits us perfectly. Besides, Belarus cannot support armed forces which are too large. We got about 140,000 servicemen from the former armed forces of the USSR, but only about 70,000 will remain in service in the republic, that is, we have to reduce the size of the army by 50%. This is a painful process because it directly affects people’s futures.

In order to make the officers’ transition to civilian institutions easier, a servicemen’s training and employment agency is being set up in Belarus. A few days ago, for example, we opened a business school for decommissioned officers.

We have also, jointly with the Supreme Council, the government, and representatives from local authorities, worked out a sophisticated approach to resolving social problems in

the army. Now, before a military unit is stationed somewhere, questions surrounding accommodations and the employment of soldiers and their families after they leave the army are being worked out. The parliament has passed laws which stipulate an obligation to supply apartments to servicemen assigned to the reserves.

Of course, it is still too early to say that a smoothly-operating mechanism for resolving social problems has been established, but the authorities have confirmed their intention to do so.

IF: Are there citizens of Belarus serving in the armies of other republics?

CHAUS: About 40,000 of our citizens served in the army of the USSR and are now located in various former Soviet republics. Many of them would now like to return to their motherland and continue serving in Belarus. This is an entirely lawful wish, but at the same time poses a social problem. Of course, if there are vacancies in the Belarusian army, those so wishing are transferred to posts in the republic. This, however, is not easy, considering that our armed forces already have to be reduced by half.

IF: How did the swearing of loyalty oaths to Belarus proceed?

CHAUS: About 6 months before the fact, we informed all servicemen in Belarus of the necessity of taking such an oath, thus giving them the opportunity seriously to consider their answer. Those who took the oath are serving in the Belarusian armed forces without any kind of discrimination based on nationality. There is only one criterion here - military service.

IF: What is happening with the Soviet military equipment in Belarus?

CHAUS: Part of the equipment, together with troops, is being withdrawn from the republic in accordance with our treaty with Russia. Another part is remaining in service with the Belarusian armed forces. Any equipment remaining in our country which contravenes CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] agreements will be destroyed or sold. There is a sufficient number of parties wishing to buy military equipment and supplies. Nearby countries, including the Baltic states, the countries of Eastern Europe, former Warsaw Pact member-states, and newly-formed states are asking Belarus to sell them such equipment. Because of international agreements, however, we cannot sell to all of them.

IF: What is Belarus's position on strategic nuclear forces?

CHAUS: As of now, we are legally not a nuclear state. There are, however, still missiles with nuclear warheads in the republic. According to an agreement we signed, these weapons must be removed within seven years. Two points of view with respect to this point exist in the republic. Some deputies and soldiers are convinced that this deadline should be sooner. Others advise against haste, though not because they distrust Russia. Most likely just the opposite. Belarus understands Russia's needs and position well, and we hope that Russia understands us.

The world situation changed after the signing of the START II treaty. Of course, Russia will bear the greatest burden in maintaining nuclear forces. Furthermore, we cannot help but be worried about the U.S. position on nuclear weapons. How will the new administration handle itself? Will the American congress ratify the treaty? We, the servicemen, unfortunately cannot rule out the possibility that America has new types of missile technology. In comparison with other countries, then, their options are becoming much more numerous. One must wait and observe - will American policy be honest? Again, I want to emphasize that we trusted, and still completely trust Russia, and I hope that they trust us too. Otherwise, as they say, "it's not worth two cents" to us. But we must know whether our partners in nuclear disarmament have honest intentions.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Chief's Briefing on Inspections

*MK1702103593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Feb 93 p 1*

[Andrey Bayduzhiy report: "Verification of Fulfillment of Treaties Is Reliable. Americans Visit Facilities Every Three Days"]

[Text] Yesterday Lieutenant General Vladimir Medvedev, head of the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, briefed journalists on the work of this organization, which comes within the Defense Ministry structure. The center has some 150 staffers and is called upon to exercise verification of the fulfillment of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the agreement on the limitation of conventional armed forces in Europe. In the 5 years of the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center's existence, its experts have carried out some 300 inspections (proverok) on U.S. territory alone, and have in turn received the Americans more than 600 times. This discrepancy in figures is due to the number of facilities subject to inspection under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles: 117 in the former USSR and 32 in the United States. The elimination of missiles has taken place at eight Soviet and four U.S. facilities. As Vladimir Medvedev stated, despite the intensive schedule for inspections—various military facilities are visited by American inspectors every 2 to 3 days—and the rather tight time scale which stipulates that not more than 9 hours must elapse between the time of notification and arrival on site, in the course of fulfillment of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles no serious complaints by one side against the other have been recorded. The experience of the Soviet-U.S. treaty is also being utilized in the course of verification of fulfillment of the agreement on the limitation of conventional armed forces in Europe, under which some 500 military facilities in former republics of the Soviet Union and a further 1,500 belonging to other European states are subject to inspections. Thus at the time of the press conference a Spanish delegation was in Wuensdorf verifying the number of armored carriers there as part of the group of Soviet forces in Germany, while in St. Petersburg the Dutch were monitoring the process of destruction of tanks. A group of Russian experts, in turn, were flying to a base in San

Francisco under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

A. Arbatov Weighs Pros, Cons of START II

93WC0025A Moscow NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL
in English No 3, Jan 93 pp 12-14

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences and director of the Geopolitical and Military Forecasting Center: "A Treaty Is a Treaty"]

[Text] Times have changed, indeed... in the first two decades of strategic arms reduction talks the Soviet people could be trusted to "enthusiastically support and approve" whatever their leaders signed. The problem, always was whether an agreement would be ratified by the US Senate. And now it's all the other way around.

Lucrative Expenditures

The new Treaty provides for unprecedentedly deep strategic arms cuts: to about a third of the present CIS and US level by the year 2003. Or, counting from the ceiling of the START-I Treaty, signed by Gorbachev and Bush in the summer of 1991 and ratified recently, to a half.

The physical volumes of the expected cuts look impressive even to non-experts. By the year 2003, each side's strategic arms will be restricted to the ceiling of 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads as against 10-12,000 today and 7-8,000 that would have been allowed under the previous START-I Treaty.

A no less important, even though less conspicuous, fact is that both sides have called off, or stopped at an early stage of implementation, most of their costly strategic arsenal modernization programmes. Although the slowing down of the arms race has not always been immediately related to the Treaty, it reflected the new military-political and economic realities embodied by START-2.

Such a major arms cut will be quite costly, with all the expenses involved in eliminating missiles, launching pads, submarines and bombers and in depositing thousands of warheads. At a preliminary estimate, this will cost us about 40 billion rubles (in 1992 prices). If no cuts had been made, the expenditures on the maintenance and logistic support of the deployed arms systems would have amounted to no less than 200 billion over the decades.

In the nineties, we would have been compelled to eliminate a substantial proportion of the armaments now being cut (over 50 percent of missiles, planes and submarines) anyway because of physical ageing and wear. As distinct from the USA, Russia would have been unable to replace them by new-generation systems in the absence of the Treaty, our industry is in a mess, and all industrial co-production arrangements within the framework of the former USSR have broken up (for example, two of the three plants manufacturing the latest intercontinental ballistic missile are located in Ukraine).

It is about time we stopped regarding the disarmament and arms control expenditures as "unproductive." From the

angle of the end product—disarmament—it would do both sides more good to go to expense of disarmament once than to waste their money on rounds upon rounds of the arms race, on making weapons which are never to be used—and then on replacing them by new and still costlier weapon generations.

It is obligatory on both sides, of course, to guarantee maximum mutual security, to select the most economical practical ways of arms reduction, of maintaining sufficiency and stability. It is over these issues that the clashes between the supporters and opponents of START-2 will certainly be the fiercest.

Coming to a Compromise

The mutual concessions of the sides have made it possible, on balance, to advance towards the new Treaty from the points of departure provided by START-I. The concessions boil down to the following. Washington started with limiting the main component of its strategic nuclear arms—sea-launched missiles. The sublevel for them was set at 1,700-1,750 warheads which is a third of the present one and a half of that provided for by the previous Treaty. The Trident-2 missiles will, from now on, be fitted with half as many warheads (of a third their former yield—which, incidentally, is not directly connected with the Treaty).

The US for the first time also agreed to count the main armament of heavy bombers in physical units rather than in terms of a conventional coefficient as had been the case before. The coefficient allowed them to keep 2-2,2500 sea-launched nuclear warheads in excess of the formal ceiling. What's more important still, the Americans will have to discard the Peacekeeper ICBM (500 warheads), the newest and the most efficient pre-emptive attack weapons, and to place part of submarines and bombers out of commission.

For Russia, the provision of the new Treaty banning ground-launched intercontinental MIRVed missiles is of the greatest importance. Missiles fitted with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles have traditionally constituted the backbone of Soviet strategic forces and their strategy. MIRVed missiles constituted over 60 percent of our strategic potential in terms of warheads (as against less than 15 percent in the US).

The banning of these weapons faces Moscow with a difficult dilemma. If we insist on keeping the previous pattern of strategic forces with ICBMs predominating, then, instead of the MIRVed missiles we shall have to deploy 1,200-1,400 monoblock (single-warhead) ground-launched missiles (now we have about 300 such new IBMs). It is only in this way that we can keep for this element of the triad at least a half of the warheads within the limits of the overall ceiling of 3,000-3,500. This, however, would call for enormous expenses (over 400 billion rubles in 1992 prices), which Russia cannot afford.

A cheaper alternative is to add no more than 100-200 single-warhead missiles to the missiles already deployed. That would amount to a total disintegration of the traditional structure of our strategic nuclear forces as a result of

the ground-launched component diminishing from 60 to 15 percent. This option does not only infringe upon the interests of the strategic missile forces, the leading fighting arms, but runs counter to the accepted strategy, to the long established ideas of parity and security requirements.

The START-2 will all but upset the existing concepts and plans. It is impossible to deploy as many monoblock missiles as to send up thousands of warheads in one launching. Besides, mobile ICBMs are less suitable for an encounter strike, their survivability lies in mobility, not in fast launching.

Under the new Treaty, the share of submarine-based ballistic missiles (SBBM) is to grow in Russia from 30 to over 50 percent (exhausting the sublevel of 1,700-1,750 units). Unlike the Navy, the strategic missile forces will not have to build new missiles and submarines: out of the remaining 59 missile carriers, over 30 will be scrapped, with 23-25 submarines left. The main troubles with the seaborne missile forces are their one-way and unreliable communication with submerged submarines, and their vulnerability to the submarine hunters of the US and its allies. The share of bombers in our strategic forces is more modest still than that of sea-launched missiles. The effort to modernize them has been actually discontinued, most of them have got out of date or physically worn out, and the future of this component is a big question mark.

As to the USA, the pattern of its forces, just as its basic strategic plans, remain unchanged despite deep cuts in missiles (including the new systems like Peacekeeper and Trident-1). The Americans will keep 500 silo-mounted Minuteman-3 ICBMs, each retaining one of its three warheads, and may complete the construction of 18 Ohio submarines armed with the Trident-2 missiles. About a hundred bombers will carry cruise missiles.

For all magnitude of mutual concessions, it must be admitted that START-2 will have a more radical, irreversible and costlier effect on Russia than it will on the USA. This will certainly be the opposition's chief argument against START-2 as it clashes with Yeltsin over it.

Counterblows Planned

It is easy to guess what kind of criticism will be levelled against the new Treaty. For all their variety, these arguments will boil down to two.

One argument will consist in that START-2, by banning MIRVed missiles, will undermine our traditional strategy and upset parity. This line of reasoning will be taken by many figures in the military-industrial complex, by opposition politicians and retired army officers. Official representatives of the armed forces will share this view even if they outwardly support the treaty by force of discipline.

They will be consistent in their own way. What makes them wrong, however, is that the canonized principles of parity and sufficiency which took shape in a totalitarian militarized state over the decades of the Cold War must undergo radical revision. This is necessary now that the international situation has changed entirely and that a democratic law-governed state is being built in Russia.

It is impermissible, above all, to stick to the counterstrike concept we have inherited from the years of brinkmanship. After all, it takes a missile only 15-30 minutes to reach its target. This leaves the President only one or two minutes to decide on a nuclear missile launching which will have monstrous consequences. This "finger-on-the-trigger" strategy may well cause accidental nuclear war through a technical error, miscalculation at the top, or unsanctioned actions by missilemen in a crisis.

In future, the danger of a nuclear strike being dealt "by mistake" will grow further if deterrence becomes multilateral following the emergence of new nuclear powers in possession of ballistic missiles. To make the matters worse, six out of our 11 big early warning radars have found themselves outside Russia after the breakup of the USSR, and, therefore, cannot be relied upon in a crisis. Missile launching on a satellite signal, without the fact of a nuclear attack being confirmed by radar, will amount to a suicide.

All this has directly to do with START-2. In the new political and strategic situation it is necessary to change over to the retaliation strategy, so that the President could make the right decision in a crisis, ascertain who the attacker is and assess the consequences of the strike. And so that political control over the use of strategic weapons be a reality, not wishful thinking on the part of Russia's leaders (as was the case with the leaders of the Soviet Union).

Silo-mounted missiles are too vulnerable to serve as the mainstay of the new strategy. Those are "launch or lose" missiles. Therefore, a shift of emphasis to less vulnerable, even though slower, systems like mobile ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles would be necessary for us in any case. Silo missiles—standing out from the rest in their combat readiness, reliable communication facilities and cheapness of maintenance—could be used only as a means of supporting other forces, but not as the base of war prevention strategy.

Further, do we really need equality with the US in counterforce capability? After all, the strategic forces' kill potential, on any side, necessarily presupposes a pre-emptive strike. Rivalry along these lines undermine stability. On the contrary, the measures taken by any side to enhance their missiles' survivability create no danger to the other side but objectively detract from its counterforce capability.

In other words, START-1 is, indeed hardly compatible with traditional strategy, levels and structure of forces, and the character of their control system. All this suffers from serious flaws and has to be revised in the present situation. Such a revision combines well with the basic parameters of the new Treaty. Reforms, always painful and costly in the military sphere, should be made easier by international agreements. And now, let us proceed to the second argument against START-2.

As far as Russia is concerned, the chief problem is how to fill, within the Treaty framework, the gap in strategic forces to be left by the proposed elimination of MIRVed ICBMs. The deployment of new missiles involves great expenses, but then it is possible to use the existing systems.

Moscow's ready consent, last June, to ban mobile as well as silo-mounted MIRVed missiles cannot but cause bewilderment. In principle, mobile ground-based MIRVed missiles are in no way inferior, from the viewpoint of stability, to sea-based ones; they are less vulnerable and less suitable for a disarming strike while being a rather economical and reliable means of retaliation. A group of 36 RS-22 (SS-24) mobile ICBMs, mounted on railway platforms, could serve as an impressive 360-warhead deterrent which now has to be made up for by deploying monoblock missiles. As a last resort, an agreement could be reached on making them monoblock by reducing the number of each missile's warheads from 10 to 1. No such agreement materialized, however.

Our request for the right to reduce the number of warheads on the RS-18 (SS-19) missiles so as to make them monoblock and to keep the launching sites of the heavy ICBMs RS-20 (SS-18), were granted only partially. Since Russia is planning to mount hundreds of monoblock missiles in silos, it would be cheaper to use 150 modified launching sites than to build new ones. If carried out, our proposals would have cut the expenses involved in the deployment of monoblock missiles by about a third (or by 60 billion rubles).

Are Missiles Really Necessary?

"Is it really necessary to build new missiles and missile control systems amid deep arms cut?" liberal politicians may ask. "Why all that fuss about retaliatory capability in a situation where the US is not going to attack us?"

This is a matter of rational military policy, not of fear of aggression. If we are to preserve our strategic forces after the year 2000, the best form they can exist in is that of an invulnerable and efficiently controlled retaliatory capability. The only alternative to it is the first-strike capability which both the Americans and ourselves are deliberately giving up. START-2 is built exactly on the principles of strategic stability and removing the first-strike threat through a mutual retaliatory capability at sharply lowered quantitative levels.

The United States is extremely serious—and even, it appears, excessively conservative—about guaranteeing its deterrent capability. In a number of cases, Russia should insist on more radical measures with regard to the USA. In response for its truly historic move towards stability—the consent to the elimination of silo-mounted MIRVed ICBMs, heavy ones included—Moscow have the US to agree not to arm its eight Ohio-type submarines with the heavy Trident-2 counterforce missiles instead of the Trident-1 submarine-based missiles they now carry.

Because the retaliatory strike parameters are to be reduced sharply, a very careful approach should be taken even to the limited anti-missile defence problem. The preservation of the ABM Treaty is inseparably linked with the logic of the reduction and restructuring of strategic offensive arms and of revising nuclear strategy as part of drawing back from the brink of war.

The former USSR's strategic forces deployed outside Russia deserve a special mention here. It is an open secret that the

danger of nuclear forces being divided between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus gave the strongest stimulus to more radical cuts. Last May, Ukraine and two other republics undertook, in Lisbon, to remove weapons from their territories in the context of the START-1 Treaty.

The new Treaty does not facilitate the solution of this problem because other republics have assumed no formal obligations under it. Judging by everything, Russia did not consult them before signing START-2, which may create new political problems. In the deadlines set for the elimination of MIRVed missiles, the Treaty adds little to the Lisbon agreements.

The problem could be solved by reaching an agreement with the US on a cheap and accelerated (one- or two-year) time-table for getting the missiles out of commission by detaching warheads from the ICBMs to be scrapped and placing them in storage under mutual supervision.

On the whole, START-2 is, without a doubt, a major step in the right direction and merits every approval. It is not altogether free from shortcomings, however. The way out may lie in starting with the new US administration, right after the conclusion of the treaty, talks on extra measures for arms reduction and limitation. There exists a precedent for that: the term for which START-2 has been signed exceeds that of START-1. Supplementary agreements may adjust and deepen START-2.

Such measures could include the lowering of common ceilings, more serious limitations of the US counterforce systems and acceleration of arms reduction rates.

Democratic policy cannot be pursued by undemocratic methods. However good the intentions, this inevitably leads to mistakes and miscalculations, to extra economic and political expenses, makes the policy of reforms much more vulnerable to attacks by the implacable opposition, disunites the front of its supporters, and results in the overall instability and unpredictability of Russia's line. This applies to the entire policy of the Yeltsin administration, and even such a specific sphere of this policy as strategic arms limitation and reduction is no exception.

West Urged To Meet Ukraine's START Concerns

93WC0025B Moscow *NEW TIMES INTERNATIONAL*
in English No 3, Jan 93 p 15

[Article by Dmitriy Volskiy "Observer's View": "Yeltsin, Kravchuk and the Nuclear Jinni"]

[Text] The Moscow meeting of Yeltsin and Kravchuk in mid-January was remarkable for many reasons: certain progress was reached in settling differences over former Soviet indebtedness as well as on the issue of Russian oil supplies to Ukraine and other matters worrying the two largest Slavonic states in the wake of the disintegration of the USSR. But this "internal dispute of Slavs," to use Pushkin's expression, cannot but worry the world community as well, primarily because it concerns such a vitally important issue as nuclear security.

In this respect the meeting between the two presidents was not for nought either. Yeltsin promised Ukraine to guarantee protection against potential nuclear attack, while Kravchuk promised to get the START-1 treaty ratified by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and support the newly signed Russian-American START-2 agreement. The Ukrainian President confirmed his country's intention to become a non-nuclear state and join, at last, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, one could only applaud such progress, if not for certain circumstances. Firstly, these agreements are rather abstract ones, while life shows that any problems concerning nukes can only be successfully solved with a use of computers, so to speak. Concrete work remains to be done.

Secondly, it's no secret that far from all in Ukrainian political circles want to make Ukraine a non-nuclear state, nor has everyone supported the radical reduction prescribed by START. Even in the Ukrainian Parliament one could hear people say that START-2 is nothing more than a "separate deal" between the USA and Russia. More than that—the Union of Ukrainian Officers, for instance, doesn't conceal its dream of making Ukraine the world's fourth, if not third, nuclear power possessing more warheads than Britain or France.

The proponents of this idea see no risk. At first there was only one nuclear power, then the second appeared, and still later their number reached five, and the world goes on. As for Ukraine, her temporary, if not eternal possession of nuclear arms may become a new security factor, a counterbalance to Russia's potential which alone still remains capable of threatening the USA, even with START-2 taken into account. These were roughly the arguments resorted to in Kiev in the conversations with American Senators Nunn and Lugar, who visited ex-Soviet republics late last year. Three high-ranking Ukrainian officials informed us in Kiev about their resolve to exercise Ukrainian administrative control over these arms (i.e., the ex-Soviet warheads deployed on Ukrainian territory.—D.V.) in order to rule out their launching under Russian orders from Ukraine and to preserve the potential value of these arms as a trump card in negotiations and as a symbol of deterrence, said the Senators in their published report.

Judging by the report, the Senators did see it as a "symbol," but not of "deterrence." On the contrary, as one of a mounting danger of losing control over the global nuclear situation, something which they informed President Clinton about. Washington politicians were also surprised by the attempts of the Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, who visited the USA after Christmas, to obtain financial compensations for rejecting claims to nuclear arms. On January 9 *The Washington Post* warned against creating a dangerous precedent of paying ransom for nukes. Won't other countries, such as Brazil or North Korea, also try to get compensations? The Ukrainian leaders' uncompromising position threatens collective security in the post-Cold War world, wrote this influential newspaper, unambiguously threatening Kiev with economic sanctions and diplomatic ostracism.

There's no doubt that all this influenced President Kravchuk's position at his talks with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, but it's worth repeating one more time that, as is usual in such situations, it will be possible to judge real results only later, when words are followed by concrete deeds. The process of implementing the compromises reached by the two leaders is affected by many factors—the progress of debating and ratifying START-2 by the Russian Supreme Soviet, the situation with the Black Sea Fleet (where the commander suitable to both sides has been at last appointed) and, of course, the internal political situation in Ukraine. But to a no smaller extent a productive solution to the Russian-Ukrainian nuclear dilemma depends on external factors—on the position taken by Western powers, primarily the USA.

Certainly, one can only congratulate these states on their awareness of the dangers of nukes spreading throughout the former USSR. To prevent such nuclear developments, it's not enough to simply support the principle of a nuclear status for Russia alone, as the legal successor to the disintegrated USSR. This principle will be hard to observe unless close economic cooperation and political interaction is reached between ex-union republics, first of all between Russia and Ukraine, be it on a bilateral basis or within the framework of the CIS.

Experience has demonstrated that the erosion of such cooperation runs contrary to the interests of "the new world order"—international security, including nuclear security, which is inseparable from the economic components of international stability and the success of the market-oriented reforms in post-communist countries. The fact that Yeltsin and Kravchuk made steps towards each other on the question of the inherited Soviet debts is a signal for Western partners too. It's time for the West to solve the overdue question of postponing the debt servicing and thus open the gate to fulfilled credits for ex-Soviet republics together with a stream of investments in their economies, because without their healthy influence it will be impossible to drive the nuclear jinni back into the bottle.

Reports on Ukrainian Consideration of START I

Clinton, Kravchuk Speak on Phone

WS1002124193 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian
28 Jan 93 p 1

[Report attributed to the press service of the Ukrainian president: "Telephone Talk"]

[Text] On 26 January 1993, President Bill Clinton telephoned President Leonid Kravchuk.

During the conversation they discussed the state and prospects of bilateral Ukrainian-American relations. Special emphasis was placed on cooperation for the solution of economic problems that Ukraine had encountered during its transition to market economy. Bill Clinton expressed his positive attitude towards the Ukrainian Government's course of reform.

At the request of the American President, L. Kravchuk informed him of the progress of preparations for the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I). He emphasized that both he and the Government of Ukraine will observe the guidelines determined by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

On his side, President Clinton confirmed the intention of the United States Administration to grant Ukraine \$175 million to support the process of dismantling the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, as well as to give Ukraine appropriate security guarantees.

The president of Ukraine spoke on the results of the recent conference of the CIS heads of states and governments, held in Minsk on 22 January and on the 15 January Ukrainian-Russian negotiations.

The presidents agreed that the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs and the United States secretary of state should establish a direct contact in order to consult and negotiate the bulk of issues that are of common interest.

At the end of the conversation, Leonid Kravchuk once again congratulated Bill Clinton on officially assuming the post of United States President and expressed hope for further cooperation on equal and mutually advantageous terms.

Faction Links START, Crimean Issues

LD0602143693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
0900 GMT 6 Feb 93

[Text] A news conference of the Congress of Ukraine's National Democratic Forces faction was held after a session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on Thursday [4 February]. The faction numbers 48 deputies and is part of the People's Council [Narodnaya Rada]. The EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA agency reports that leaders of the faction stated that since the Russian leadership questions the fact that Crimea belongs to Ukraine, that is, it puts forward territorial claims, the Congress of National Democratic Forces faction regards nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent at the current stage. Therefore, when examining the START I treaty in parliament, the faction will regard nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory as its exclusive property. Ukraine should exercise political and technical control over the weapons and will make an independent decision on the issue of their elimination. Ukraine should implement the final elimination of nuclear weapons only together with other nuclear powers.

Democrats Want To Keep Nuclear Arms

OW0602192293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1733 GMT 6 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The parliamentary fraction of the Ukrainian Congress of National and Democratic Movements is in favour of the retention by Ukraine of nuclear weapons and is demanding the authorities' full control over these.

A statement issued Friday [5 February] claimed that "nuclear weapons are a key factor of restraint when almost all neighbouring states, especially Russia, are making territorial claims on Ukraine."

The Congress did, however, concede that it may allow a certain reduction in the number of Ukrainian nuclear warheads.

The Congress is an association of parties of nationalist and democratic persuasion which support the policies of President Leonid Kravchuk. The Congress' parliamentary fraction includes 39 deputies.

Up to the present not one political organisation in Ukraine, apart from the "Green" party, has declared its support for the total liquidation of the republic's nuclear arsenal.

Black Fleet Spokesman Comments

LD0802133193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1245 GMT 8 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow February 8 TASS—Ukrainian nationalists want to preserve the nuclear status of their country and are going to convene a conference in mid-February under the motto "nuclear status of Ukraine - best guarantee of peace, security and stability in Europe", spokesman of the Black Sea fleet Sergey Ozerov told TASS on Monday quoting sources in the Ukrainian Defence Ministry.

The organisers of the conference from the Ukrainian National Assembly Movement believe that the START-2 Treaty makes Russia an independent nuclear weapons producer and that the conference should explain why Ukraine is preserve its nuclear status.

President Meets Press

LD0802133693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1303 GMT 8 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Viktor Vernodubenko]

[Excerpt] Kiev February 8 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk reiterated on the eve of his visit to Great Britain that Ukraine strives to become a nuclear-free state.

He told reporters on Monday [8 February] that the ratification of the START I Treaty has been included into the agenda of the republican parliament and that lawmakers are currently studying the necessary documents, analysing foreign and home policy issues and financial problems. Special attention is paid to security guarantees to Ukraine, he added.

Kravchuk stressed that there are no grounds to change the chosen course and that the country strives to be a nuclear-free state. [passage omitted]

Parliament Chairman on Ratification Delay

LD1002204093 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino
Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT
10 Feb 93

[By Vladimir Lyaskalo; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Political struggle makes one think more about the need for peace. We have just received a report from Kiev, where a news conference was held by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and where the ratification of the Start I Treaty was discussed.

[Begin recording] [Lyaskalo] During a break between sessions today, Supreme Soviet Chairman Ivan Stepanovich Plyushch held a news conference. Our first question was how could the slowness with which the Supreme Soviet approached the ratification of the treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons be explained?

[Plyushch] Ukraine wants to clarify for itself all aspects of the mechanism that has been proposed for resolving this accord. You know about this mechanism. First of all, it means material and financial resources for implementing this work. Ukraine does not have them at present. Second, what and how will it affect Ukraine's security in case of implementation? These are two principle issues. We did not go back on the principle that Ukraine is a nonaligned, nuclear-free, and neutral state, but all this requires a clarification of the situation. I do not see a problem whether this treaty is ratified in February, March, or April. [end recording]

Further Plyushch Comment

OW1002203693 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1941 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Ivan Plyushch commenting on the Russian president's decree about the former Soviet Union's property abroad said that "nothing terrible happened. Ukraine must not bang the door following the decree". Speaking in Kiev on Wednesday [10 February], he called to start high-level talks with Russia at which "to ask Yeltsin why he issued such a decree and then try to resolve the question of debt-sharing".

Under Yeltsin's decree, Russia claims for all of the former Soviet Union's property abroad as heir apparent to the USSR.

Plyushch said the document was an indication of "who is supporting the CIS and who is destroying it".

On the ratification of the START-I agreement by the Ukrainian parliament, he said this would happen only after Ukraine was fully convinced that its security is guaranteed and it does not stand to suffer economically from the destruction of strategic nuclear weapons. Plyushch said the question of timing was of no importance to Ukraine, adding that the ratification could take place this month or next or in April. He said the parliament's overriding priority was to try to appease the people.

The Ukrainian official also said the absence of this year's budget is explained by the dispute over prices of Russian fuel exports to Ukraine.

On the national army, Plyushch said Ukraine "could not afford the upkeep of the present army" whose numerical strength is 700,000 servicemen. He said that under the government plan, troop numbers would be slashed down to 400,000 in the next 2 years, and to 200,000 in 5 to 7 years after that.

Russia 'Not Always' Reliable

LD1002210693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1958 GMT 10 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik for TASS]

[Text] Kiev February 10 TASS—"We hope to solve all disputes through negotiations with the Russian leadership," Ukrainian Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Plyushch told a news conference in Kiev on Wednesday [10 February].

Commenting on the Russian presidential decree declaring Russia the only legal successor to the property of the former Soviet Union in foreign countries, Plyushch said Russia does not always act as a reliable partner.

At the same time he stressed that Ukraine has to reckon with Russia since it depends on Russian fuel and energy supplies.

Plyushch said Ukraine is unlikely to attend the inter-parliamentary assembly, which he described as an artificial and redundant structure doubling the work of inter-parliamentary committees and commission which coordinate law-making activities. Moreover, Ukraine is seeking integration into the European Community. Plyushch said.

Deputy Foreign Minister on Desired Guarantees

OW1002171293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1659 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The security guarantees that Ukraine wants from nuclear states must rule out the possibility both of armed aggression and economic pressure as well as ensure its territorial integrity. Deputy Foreign Minister and Chairman of the National Disarmament Committee Borys Tarasyuk told INTERFAX.

He said Ukraine would seek security guarantees from all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. On foreign aid to help destroy Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, Tarasyuk said his country did not speak in terms of concrete sums involved but just wanted to convince its Western partners that the amount of aid must correspond to the actual cost of weapons destruction.

Tarasyuk said that Russia and Ukraine held two days of talks outside Kiev on the issue of weapons destruction late last month but had failed to reach any agreement because of substantial differences. Ukraine demanded that Russia must pay compensation money not only for the strategic nuclear weapons still on its territory but also for the tactical nuclear weapons which were transferred to Russia last spring.

Deputy Foreign Minister: Ukraine 'Not Haggling'

MK1102100193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 11 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with Boris Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and chairman of the National Committee for Disarmament Questions, by Vladimir Skachko; place and date not given: "We Are Not Haggling Over Anything With Anyone." Financial Aspect of Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] It has been reported that the question of ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction [START I] and of Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is on the agenda for the Seventh Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Session. Boris Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and chairman of the National Committee for Disarmament Questions, tells us about the situation surrounding this issue and the conditions for its resolution by the Ukrainian parliament.

Tarasyuk: There is a lot of talk in the world today about Ukraine delaying the treaties' ratification, but this is not a delay, there is no delay. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet commission has been studying these questions in depth for six months. By a decision of the presidium, a deputies' group was set up to draw up documents for examination. I took part in this group's work as an expert. Organizationally, it is divided into five subgroups for various areas of work, and the work consists in studying all the possible consequences of ratification.

Skachko: Do you know what the balance is in parliament between the "nuclear doves" and the "nuclear hawks"?

Tarasyuk: We know that there is a group of deputies in parliament who are opposed to the ratification of the START I Treaty and accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and indeed to a nuclear-free status for Ukraine. But nobody has conducted a serious poll on these problems, so it would be wrong to talk about the numerical ratio of opponents to supporters of these documents. I think we may be talking about the existence of an active group of deputies studying this question, while the vast majority have yet to make up their minds. I also wish to say that the Supreme Soviet's attitude to ratification and accession is generating increasing interest in the world. I saw this for myself during a visit to the United States 6-8 January this year.

Skachko: It is well known that the main result of that visit was the reiteration of U.S. readiness to provide Ukraine with written security guarantees in the event of its ratification of the START I Treaty and accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty. On the other hand, various news media claim that the American side does not understand what kind of guarantees Ukraine is demanding. Could you clarify this?

Tarasyuk: When we talk about guarantees of Ukraine's security on the part of the nuclear states, this is nothing new for official Washington, since we have been conducting talks on the subject since April last year. We take this view of guarantees: In the event that Ukraine ratifies the START I Treaty and accedes to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state, the most important question for it will be national security. Ukraine is a young state which is going through a period of the establishment of the main institutions of statehood, including the Armed Forces. We cannot yet claim that Ukraine has its own Armed Forces; they are at the stage of being reshaped and formed. Our military-industrial complex, which hitherto was an integral part of the former USSR's military-industrial complex, is in the same situation. In addition, Ukraine is not a member of any military-political bloc, and cannot be, since it has renounced membership of blocs [provozglasila vneblokovost]. In this

situation the question of safeguarding national security arises, especially when calls to change the borders can be heard and territorial claims against Ukraine are being made in neighboring states. We believe that Ukraine's security can be based not only on the existence of its own Armed Forces, but also on Ukraine's participation in appropriate international structures. We see the best prospect in creating an all-European security system, for which the Ukrainian side presented an initiative at the forum on questions of cooperation in the security field currently being held in Vienna. Ukraine's initiative has won very many supporters, and we are now preparing a detailed document which will provide an opportunity to gain a better understanding of our stance in terms of the creation of this system. If created, it will become a reliable security guarantee not only for Ukraine, but also for other European countries, particularly the members of the former Warsaw Pact. The so-called "security vacuum" which has developed in Eastern and Central Europe compels these states to seek their own ways to safeguard security, and Ukraine is not alone in this desire. We also need guarantees as a state which has every right to be a nuclear state, as an equal legal successor to the USSR, but which itself wishes voluntarily to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Skachko: But people say that in 1968 the nuclear states, aware of their responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the world, guaranteed security to all other states, and so obviously the question arises: What more does Ukraine want?

Tarasyuk: Yes, it is true that those guarantees were offered. But, first, in 1968 Ukraine did not exist as an autonomous state. Second, the guarantees were offered by a member of the UN Security Council that no longer exists, namely the USSR. Russia, which was permitted to take that place in the Security Council, has not confirmed these guarantees to Ukraine, and meanwhile certain Russian political circles are today putting forward at the highest level territorial claims against Ukraine. That is why we are today demanding security guarantees from all the nuclear states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which, under the UN Charter, are charged with special responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the world. Today we already have draft documents on guarantees from the United States, Britain, and Russia. Unfortunately, we cannot regard the Russian version as satisfactory, and therefore we are now waiting for the statement which Russian President Boris Yeltsin made during his meeting with our president in Moscow to be embodied in an appropriate document. The document on security guarantees to Ukraine should contain three main points: first, exclusion of the possibility of aggression against Ukraine by nuclear states using either nuclear or conventional arms. Second, nonuse of economic pressure against Ukraine to secure economic or political advantages. Third, unconditional recognition and respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine's present borders.

Skachko: What can you tell us about the recent Ukrainian-Russian talks in Irpen near Kiev on questions of Ukraine's receiving compensation from Russia for the nuclear weapons?

Tarasyuk: We have to resolve the main problem: what the conditions will be for the dismantling and destruction of weapons, because Ukraine considers itself the owner of the physical components of the weapons and has an interest in receiving, for instance, uranium—not weapons-grade, but industrial, less concentrated, which could be used as fuel for Ukraine's nuclear power stations. We are also willing to accept the monetary equivalent of this uranium. It is not only a matter of compensation for the warheads [boyezaryady] of the strategic nuclear weapons that we still have, but also for the warheads [boyezaryady] of the tactical nuclear weapons that were removed to Russia in the spring of last year. The first round of talks in Irpen, initiated by the Ukrainian side, was devoted to resolving these questions. We hope that a second round will be held in late February, because the positions and views set forth by the two sides in Irpen differed, and time is needed for analysis and the possible mutual adjustment of positions. Another problem at the Irpen talks was that of maintaining nuclear safety in relation to the strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine. To this end it is necessary to ensure that regulatory work is carried out within the context of manufacturer's and technical maintenance of nuclear missile systems by those who manufactured and installed these systems. Ukraine is sometimes accused of preventing this maintenance. That is not true. On the contrary, Ukraine has an interest in ensuring that maintenance under guarantee is carried out according to the same schedules and on the same scale as was stipulated hitherto. Furthermore the guaranteed life of certain systems is approaching its end, and we are talking about a real nuclear danger from these missiles not only for Ukraine, but for all the neighboring states too.

Skachko: What would you say about the following point of view, which is current in the world: that Ukraine is deliberately delaying ratification and traveling around the world haggling, trying to get as much money as possible in exchange for the nuclear missiles, so as to use this money for current expenditure in the economy?

Tarasyuk: This view is totally unfounded. Ukraine is not haggling over anything with anyone, it is acting on the basis that the program for dismantling nuclear missile systems requires considerable resources, and that allocating those resources, in the context of an economic crisis, is not and cannot be the top priority for the Ukrainian Government today. We simply don't have the money. That is why, during contacts with our foreign partners, we do not bargain over some specific sum, we explain that we are counting on help of a kind that will enable us to eliminate nuclear arms on schedule following ratification of the START I Treaty. And the idea is that this financial aid would be given for a special purpose—solely for the destruction of nuclear systems and the resolution of the associated problems. We are also trying to explain that the pace of destruction of nuclear weapons is directly dependent on the existence of the appropriate material and technical facilities. In Washington we said once again, look, we are grateful to the United States for the intention to allocate \$175 million to us, but we stressed that the scale of the expenditure necessary to destroy the nuclear weapons is much greater than that.

Skachko: What should the sum be?

Tarasyuk: We cannot say today, because some of the technologies for the missile destruction process do not even exist. They still have to be developed, and you have to calculate the money according to the technologies, not the other way about. President Leonid Kravchuk, realizing that it is beyond our powers today to finance independently the programs for the destruction of nuclear missile systems, put forward at the recent world economic forum in Davos the idea of creating an international nuclear disarmament fund, which would offer a real opportunity for all interested states to join in providing financial aid for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It should be a special-purpose fund which can be used by any state seeking to get rid of its nuclear potential.

Parliamentary Faction Outlines Obstacles

*OW1102175293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1721 GMT 11 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine will need at least \$2 Bn [billion] for the destruction of strategic nuclear arms, and the removal of missiles from the republic will cost more than \$6 Bn.

These figures come from a statement from the influential Ukrainian parliamentary faction Congress of National Democratic Forces (CNDF). The statement was drawn up in connection with the Supreme Soviet's upcoming discussion of the START-I treaty.

130 Ukrainian CC-19 missiles contain approximately 13,000 tons of highly toxic fuel. Ukraine is in no position to destroy them because it lacks the technical means to do so.

While expressing their principal agreement with the need to destroy nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory, the CNDF draws the world community's attention to the fact that "financial, economic, and ecological problems in nuclear disarmament will not allow the republic to dismantle their nuclear weapons in an extremely short period of time."

The National Democrats' statement also points out that "under conditions when the Russian Government is advancing territorial claims on Ukraine, we are forced to consider nuclear weapons as a means of strategic defense."

Environment Minister Interviewed

*LD1402211893 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 93*

[Studio phone-in interview with Yuriy Kostenko, minister of environmental protection and head of the Commission of Deputies for Issues of Nuclear Disarmament, by correspondents Viktoriya Popovych and Vadym Zadorozhnyy and producer Iryna Kovalenko in Kiev; from "At the Crossroads of Opinions" program;—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Zadorozhnyy] Mr. Kostenko is 42 and was born in Vinnitsa Oblast. He has been rapidly promoted from research associate at the Institute of Electric Welding in Kiev to minister in less than three years. [passage omitted]

[Popovych] We reckon that you, esteemed listeners, have at least some idea about who our guest is and we directly proceed to the topic of today's program, which is: Does Ukraine need nuclear weapons? [passage omitted]

[Kostenko] This is an extremely important and complex issue because these nuclear weapons are permanent and the strategic missiles are deployed in launching silos, which are, as a rule, high-capacity engineering installations. For example, to only remove this carrier rocket, a whole series of operations need to be performed. To begin with, the warhead itself needs to be removed, then the fuel needs to be pumped out, then the oxidant needs to be pumped out, and some operations are needed in connection with the necessity to comply with the norms of ecological safety, because this material is extremely toxic. Then all of this and eventually the carrier rocket itself need to be removed and transported to the site of deactivation of the missile itself. Then the material or, to be more precise, the components need either to be stored somewhere or utilized or reprocessed. And these issues are complex too.

And it is here, when dealing with this part of the issue relating to nuclear warheads, that a whole number of other issues arise, without whose settlement the nuclear disarmament that is being talked about so much by everybody simply cannot be carried out.

So, speaking about what has remained, which is in fact 176 strategic missiles equipped with varying numbers of warheads, once again, this potential at present essentially makes Ukraine the third largest nuclear state in the world. So, unfortunately we still have quite a lot remaining. [passage omitted]

[Popovych] We continue our program. Mr. Kostenko, please, the Supreme Council at this (?current) session is going to examine and ratify, or not ratify, the START Treaty, whereas the United States and Russia have concluded the START II Treaty not so long ago, which has to be acceded by us. What is required from Ukraine by these treaties?

[Kostenko] Well, I shall start from the end, as tradition has it. Regarding START II, whether to accede or not to accede to it will be known after the Ukrainian Supreme Council has ratified or, as you said, not ratified the START I Treaty.

[Popovych, interrupting] This is how the parliament will resolve it?

[Kostenko] Indeed. As for START I, I would like to point out the following: First, the numbers. As I have already told you, there are 176 strategic missiles deployed on our territory. At the same time, the START I Treaty does not make provisions for the number that has to be eliminated just by Ukraine, because START I was concluded between the United States and the former Soviet Union, and the overall number of carrier rockets to be eliminated by the entire Soviet Union was stipulated there, without determining that this or that be done on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine. Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as (?there appeared) only four nuclear states, the so-called Lisbon protocol was concluded. [passage omitted]

Naturally, (?all of these documents) and Russia insist that those 176 missiles be eliminated within the framework of the START Treaty. But this is what they wish, whereas I cannot even tell you so far how the Supreme Council will ratify the treaty, because, once again, back to the issue of the elimination of exactly the fixed strategic nuclear weapons, I want to note that this issue is extremely complex. And a lot depends here not even on the willingness of parliament itself, but on the technological and economic conditions that Ukraine is actually experiencing today. That is to say, to eliminate nuclear weapons, it is necessary to put together extremely large funds, and as you understand, under our current economic conditions, it is extremely difficult to find these funds in our budget. There also are other problems, I mean scientific and technological ones. [passage omitted]

So, we have to examine this issue comprehensively prior to giving recommendations to the Supreme Council as to how many missiles we have to eliminate and within what timeframe.

[Zadorozhnyy] And as for the costs, I would like to add here that Ukrainian scientists and experts made some calculations according to which around \$2 billion is needed for Ukraine to get rid of nuclear weapons. This means that the sum of \$175 million allocated by the United States is obviously not enough. As for this liquid fuel you talked about, there are almost 13,000 tonnes of it in the 130 SS-19 missiles.

[Kostenko] All of this needs to be (?eliminated).

[Popovych] And once we have already started to talk about parliament and whether it will or will not ratify the treaty, you said that you would have to examine this comprehensively. You know that now, Western [word indistinct], and in particular, Western officials now accuse Ukraine and its parliament of delaying the ratification of START I. Is this the case? Is this the delay or [word indistinct]?

[Kostenko] No, it is not. I would like to say that this issue concerning Ukraine delaying and postponing the process of ratification is absolutely far-fetched. [passage omitted]

[Hamburh] Sorry to disturb you. I am Leonid Oleksandrovych Hamburh, director general of the Association of Ukrainian-British Cooperation, from Kiev. Good evening! [passage omitted] I would very much like you to tell us and my British friends what decision on the ratification of the START I Treaty, with the decision to be submitted to the Supreme Council, has been adopted by your committee?

[Kostenko] [passage omitted] As for your question on what decisions have been prepared, the commission is now working hard on six aspects and preparing relevant expert assessment and conclusions and plans to submit the actual economic, technological, and ecological calculations necessary for this treaty to be ratified to the Supreme Council together with the START Treaty.

[Question indistinct]

[Kostenko] Of course for ratification. It is proposals alone that the commission is preparing. It is preparing proposals on ratification and if necessary, making certain cautionary

stipulations. It is preparing all of the main parts of the necessary information that the Supreme Council needs to be provided with, in order to enable it to evaluate and make calculations prior to voting either for or against ratification, so that every deputy can vote in good conscience. And for this purpose, all the necessary information needs to be collected.

[Unidentified correspondent] I would like to add the words of Margaret Thatcher: Countries avoid countries with a strong defense. This was the policy of her government and her contribution is that this policy remains in Great Britain today.

[Kostenko] I also support this view, specifically in those ways that I proposed in Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. There should be a gradual replacement of the factor of halting aggression, which today consists of nuclear weapons, and this is an extraordinary effective factor of halting aggression, and here Margaret Thatcher, the famous political activist, was absolutely right. With regard to Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, this factor, nuclear weapons, should have been gradually substituted by other factors in the system of national security, that is, not by military ones.

National security could be guaranteed, as they say, by complex factors: military potential or economic potential, as for example in Japan. Japan does not have nuclear weapons, but today, nobody dares to fight against Japan because economically, it will crush any country. There is also an extraordinarily high degree of integration among some countries, for example Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and small states, but Switzerland practically has half of the whole world's capital and not a single country, even Hitler at the time, would not dare to fight against Switzerland. Therefore, Ukraine at this point, has a powerful defense system, that is nuclear weapons, but economically, it is weak and is not integrated with those countries that could guarantee its stability. It is integrated more with Russia, which is far from being stable itself. The simple destruction of nuclear weapons, as they say, the swift dumping of this factor in the system of national security and the inadequate substitution of this factor with other factors could lead to the fact that a large hole, so to speak, could really appear in the system of our national security, which at the present time cannot be practically closed.

Therefore, in approaching this problem of nuclear disarmament in the Supreme Council, they should be very clearly aware of all these aspects connected with nuclear weapons. It would be very good to imagine what all this could lead to. But on the other hand, I would also like to say that in Ukraine there is no technical potential to support the components of the nuclear weapons at the required level. Technically, as we say [words indistinct] equal. We should also consider this factor because as we stated at the beginning of the broadcast, all enterprises that used to develop and produce nuclear warheads are located in Russia. There is only one enterprise on the territory of Ukraine, this is the Pivdenne Mashynobudivnyy Zavod [Southern Machine-Building Plant] where strategic missile launchers are developed and produced, but as for the actual warheads, the enterprises that develop those are concentrated in Russia.

[Unidentified correspondent interrupts with mostly indistinct question concerning safeguarding storage of nuclear weapons]

[Kostenko] Yes this is taking place. Relevant negotiations have now begun with the Russian Federation. The aim of these negotiations, apart from other problems, is also to regulate the problem of the safe storage of strategic nuclear weapons located in Ukraine and in Russia. The point is that we really do not have, for example, enterprises that can guarantee the safety of the nuclear warhead itself on the territory of Ukraine, but our PivdenMash, which makes launchers, as we have already stated, also services these missiles based on Russian territory. Without their service, these missiles also become themselves dangerous. This could also mean an unsanctioned launch. What is the difference, say if such a launch leads to a nuclear accident or if the warhead itself, if it has some defects, not defects, but some faults, leads to some nuclear accident. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified caller] [Question indistinct]

[Kostenko] We understand your question. Your main point is to preserve nuclear weapons in Ukraine. We understood that. But for our audience we will explain, because there were interruptions on the line, that this was a call from a representative from the Union of Officers from Ovruch as far as I could understand. Is that correct? He said that they, he used many arguments...

[Unidentified correspondent interrupting] Ovruch is in Kiev Oblast.

[Kostenko] He used many arguments, but they support retaining nuclear weapons. [Words indistinct] I would like to stress once again [word indistinct] in Independence Square that the thoughts on this, from the unreserved [word indistinct] of all this potential to full liquidation are absolutely to the contrary. Taking into account this range of ideas I think that we, deputies who represent the people, should adopt a very very balanced decision which would take into account the range of ideas to the maximum, and what is most important, which would take into account the national interests of our state to the maximum. This is the main thing that I want to say with regard to the statement by the serviceman from Ovruch. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified voice] I think that from the position of [words indistinct] our audience, that from today's questions people are concerned with the fact that if we were to disarm and destroy nuclear weapons, would our Ukraine not become a second- or third-rate country which would not be taken seriously [words indistinct]. What is your opinion?

[Kostenko] Without any doubt countries that have a considerable military potential today have, to a certain extent, a dominant position in the world. But once again I would like to stress the concept which I have already expressed. [passage omitted]

[Zadorozhnyy] All the same, as far as second-rate states are concerned, which Ukraine could become or find itself becoming, I would like to give one more quotation: Dan Miller, adviser to former U.S. Senator Henry Jackson, said

that should Ukraine renounce its nuclear weapons then it would cease to exist in the eyes of the United States. Again, this is without comment.

[Kostenko] To an extent I could support this view, because when I was in the United States in September last year I paid attention to the fact that as of today, on the part of this country, there was only one interest, which is connected with the destruction and liquidation of nuclear weapons. With regard to other problems and the process of democracy in Ukraine and other political and economic reforms which have already been initiated, then very little attention and interest were paid to them at any level where I had meetings, and I had meetings both at the level of state secretaries, then the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Supporters of a nuclear-free Ukraine say that the great nuclear states should give security guarantees to Ukraine. Some countries have already given it to Ukraine. We know that yesterday President Kravchuk returned from Great Britain and that [word indistinct] which envisages security guarantees for Ukraine on the part of Great Britain. What is your opinion on the fact that Russia is also providing such guarantees? Here I would like to quote Danny Miller again. In particular, he said that to include Russia as guarantor of Ukraine's security is almost like asking the fox to guarantee the safety of chickens.

[Unidentified correspondent] To add to our president's words: To be next to Russia is like lying in bed with an elephant.

[Kostenko] I would like to say that obviously we have our problems with regard to guaranteeing national security in general, and in particular with regard to Russia. Without doubt, what is it to guarantee national security? [passage omitted] This also applies to the guarantees which have been proposed to us. Without doubt international guarantees should be provided during the period of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. This is the political factor which will later influence Ukraine's national security. But in the end, if—excuse me—as they say, something happens, then these guarantees will not be able to influence the situation. In the first instance this concerns those guarantees which Russia could provide. How can Russia today provide guarantees if it is putting forward territorial claims against Ukraine? [passage omitted]

[Kostenko] Thank you for your question, it again demonstrates that the Supreme Council should adopt a very balanced decision. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Parliament Postpones Ratification Hearings

LD1802174593 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1630 GMT 18 Feb 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Feb—The absence of a document on Russia providing Ukraine with guarantees of nuclear safety has prompted the postponement of hearings on the ratification of the START I Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament.

Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy stated this to journalists at a meeting of the CIS joint allied forces commander in chief and plenipotentiary and permanent representatives of the Commonwealth states.

According to the Ukrainian ambassador, at talks between Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk in Moscow, the Russian president suggested pre-empting the ratification of the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons by the Ukrainian parliament by providing Ukraine with guarantees of nuclear safety. The Ukrainian side did not insist on such a formulation of the question, but as the initiative emanated from the Russian president himself, "we felt uneasy about not granting such a wish," Kryzhanovskiy said. "That is why we decided to wait until this is done. But, unfortunately, so far there is no text of guarantees that would please both the Russian and the Ukrainian sides," he said.

Kazakhstani Officials Interviewed on Nuclear Issues

President Nazarbayev on START I Implementation

AU0502173193 Vienna *DER STANDARD* in German
5 Feb 93 p 2

[Marianna Sajdik report: "Sultan 'Without Left and Right'"]

[Excerpts] Vienna—It was not only Austria's "open credit line" that brought Kazakh President Nursultan ("the fortunate sultan") Nazarbayev to Vienna. According to him, Austria and Kazakhstan are closely linked because of a common political line: "Both countries are pioneers for peace and stability." In addition, it was a particular concern for Nazarbayev to present his autobiography with the programmatic title "Without Left and Right." [passage omitted]

With 1,410 warheads on strategic missiles, Kazakhstan is the fourth nuclear power after the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. In an interview with *DER STANDARD*, Nazarbayev said that over the next seven years he will reduce the nuclear weapons stationed in Kazakhstan by 50 percent in line with the START treaty. The U.S. Congress plans to allocate \$800 million for the disassembly of all strategic weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Nazarbayev does not yet know how much of the money Kazakhstan will get. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister on Control of Weapons

NC1502185593 Cairo *AL-AHRAM* in Arabic 13 Feb 93 p 5

[Report on an interview with Foreign Minister Tuleutai Suleymenov by 'Abd-al-Malik Khalil in Alma-Ata; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Khalil] Sitting in the minister's office in Alma-Ata, I asked him: We have been hearing for dozens of years about the launch of spacecraft and astronauts from your country's airport, which is known as "Baykonur Space Airport." What has Kazakhstan gained from the use of this famous airport, and what is it doing with the strategic weapons on its soil?

[Suleymenov] The presence of nuclear weapons on Kazakh soil is not our fault. Our people have been suffering for years and still suffer from the presence of these weapons. Nuclear weapons were tested in our atmosphere between 1949 and 1967. The nuclear dust and fallout affected people, animals, and plants. You can imagine how three successive generations have been harmed by these terrible effects. Hence, we do not need these weapons. What happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened to us. They tested the weapons without asking us or our people. [passage omitted]

As for strategic nuclear weapons, they are under Russian control according to an agreement. Russia cannot use it, however, without the agreement of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; that is, the four nuclear countries. Any violation would trigger a veto and rejection. [passage omitted]

Reports on Russian START II Ratification Process

Kozyrev, Grachev To Oversee Process

LD0502140293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1334 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Text] Moscow, 5 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has appointed Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev as his representatives during the examination in the Russian Supreme Soviet of the question of the ratification of the treaty on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive armaments, which was signed with the United States on 3 January, 1993.

Yeltsin Submits Treaty

OW0902165393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1640 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday [9 February] President Boris Yeltsin of Russia submitted the Start 2 Treaty signed by the Russian and U.S. Presidents on January 3 to the Parliament for ratification. His views in parliamentary debates on the Treaty will be represented by Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee Aleksandr Piskunov told INTERFAX that a schedule of parliamentary hearings on this issue had been submitted to Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. Piskunov said that the Parliament's Presidium would meet on February 22 to discuss the package of documents on START 2.

Commentator Views Ratification Process

LD1102223293 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 11 Feb 93

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] President Yeltsin has submitted the START II Treaty for parliamentary ratification following its signing in Moscow early last month. Legislators will start debating it on 22d February. Comment is by Vladislav Kozyakov and this is what he writes:

The process of the START II Treaty's ratification opens a second front of offensive on the stockpiles of strategic nuclear arms. During the first stage, in the fight for the earliest possible ratification of the START I accord, battles already led to certain results. Four of its five signatories have completed ratification—the four are Russia, the United States, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The ball is now in Ukraine's court.

However on both fronts there is still a lot to do to overcome many hurdles. Even in the current situation when Ukraine is the only one of the five countries slowing down the coming of the START I Treaty into effect, the hesitance of the parliament in Kiev continues. This troubles not only the other participants in the treaty but the world community as a whole. All the more so, Russia, the United States and Britain have already taken concrete steps towards Ukraine which has set a number of terms for the ratification of the treaty. For one thing, President Kravchuk of Ukraine noted before the start of his trip to Britain that at their last meeting in Kiev Ukraine and Russian experts have made much progress on such issues as the transportation, stockpiling and dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Nonetheless, ratification of the accord has been postponed to March or April.

As for the upcoming ratification of the Russian-American START II Treaty in Moscow, it may be delayed too. According to press reports the treaty has opponents who argue, as some Western experts do, that the accord ensures unilateral military advantage for the United States. It's not ruled out that the parliamentary debates may be affected by the political unrest in this country. That would be the worst outcome.

And yet a forecast for ratification in Kiev and Moscow alike is far from skeptical. The START Treaties are historic achievements. Their implementation will lead to a drastic reduction of American and Russian arsenals, down to 3,500 nuclear warheads for each against the current 10,000 warheads. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus would remain countries free of nuclear weapons. Ratification of the signed agreements and their coming into force would meet the lofty national interests of each country because that would consolidate international security and stability. The 20th Century could go down in history not only by letting the dangerous genie out of the bottle but also by starting to get rid of it effectively.

Parliamentarians Propose 'Additional Commitments'

LD1202002493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1820 GMT 11 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Feb—The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committees for international affairs, foreign economic relations, and defense and security matters, as they set about examining the START II Treaty between Russia

and the United States that has been submitted for ratification, have sent a number of proposals to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The START II Treaty, the message says, is seen by the world as representing a further easing of international tension and an enhancement of security and stability throughout the world. The consolidation of the nuclear powers is especially needed now, on the threshold of a world community determining the future fate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, whose term elapses in 1995. The interests of the world community in ensuring nuclear security require a voluntary renunciation by all nonnuclear countries of the possession of nuclear weapons based on reliable united guarantees by the nuclear states that peace will be upheld, the message of the parliamentary committees emphasizes.

They propose to their U.S. colleagues that a number of possible additional commitments by both parties be discussed in the framework of the START II implementation, in particular, a commitment by Russia and the United States to reduce the number of nuclear warheads by 2005-2010 to a level commensurate with the numerical level of other nuclear powers; also to confirm Russia's and the United States' adherence to a strict observance of the ABM Treaty of 26 May 1972.

The undertaking of these commitments, the message from the Russian parliamentary committees says, will create a necessary treaty foundation for establishing a single ceiling for strategic offensive armaments for the five nuclear states in the very near future, for working out common guarantees for nuclear security, and for introducing an effective system to monitor the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Russian parliamentary committees confirmed their proposal expressed earlier that joint Russian-U.S. hearings on all aspects of the START II Treaty be held during the ratification process.

Foreign Ministry Backs Proposals 'in Principle'

LD1202145393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1358 GMT 12 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—"In principle, we support the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's appeal for further steps by Russia and the United States to reduce the number of combat nuclear weapons to a level commensurate with the level of the other nuclear powers," Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing today.

He was replying to a journalist's question about the attitude of the Russian federation foreign political department to the initiative of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations and the Committee for Questions of Defense and Security in the matter of acceleration nuclear disarmament.

"At the same time, in supporting this idea, which is line with the strategic course of Russian foreign policy, we believe that it would be more expedient to begin discussion of it

after the conclusion of the process of ratification of the START II treaty," the Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

General Staff Aide: Proposals 'Premature'

LD1602140193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1342 GMT 16 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS—In an ITAR-TASS interview on Tuesday [16 February], Colonel Vladimir Dvorkin, acting chief of the Russian Defence Ministry's Central Research Institute, described as utterly premature Russian parliamentarians' initiative concerning additional obligations by the parties to the START-2 treaty.

The Russian parliamentary committees on international affairs and foreign economic relations and on defence and security are known to have suggested that possibilities be considered within the framework of the START-2 Treaty for a reduction in nuclear weapons by Russia and the United States by the years 2005-2010 down to a level commensurate with the arsenals of the other nuclear powers.

"This is, in point of fact, an utterly new agreement and, in the opinion of Russian military experts, it is inadvisable to propose such initiatives before the START-1 and START-2 treaties enter into force and before experience, including that in the ecologically safe salvaging of nuclear weapons, is gained," Dvorkin said.

Commenting on the contents of the START-2 treaty, he pointed out that the lowering of the level of the sides' strategic offensive arms leads to the levelling out of the deterrent potentials of the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States and, consequently, to the strengthening of the military-strategic stability.

However, the scientist believes, deep cuts in strategic offensive arms should be dovetailed with limiting the influence of such destabilising factors as the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, the creation of nuclear states' coalitions opposing Russia, and a possible impact of high-precision weapons on strategic facilities during a non-nuclear period of military operations, and the development of space reconnaissance. Confidence has now arisen that the negative effect of such factors may be limited, through negotiations as well.

As far as the economic aspects of the START-2 treaty are concerned, the possibility of retooling 90 heavy missile silo launchers and converting 105 MIRVs into single-warhead missiles will make it possible to ensure for Russia a less strenuous pace of arms reduction and the phasing in of fixed-based missiles such as SS-25 and thereby reduce expenses.

In addition, the need to create new production facilities and modernise MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles is obviated.

A preliminary analysis shows that the aggregate saving of funds in the development of strategic nuclear forces of

Russia under the START-2 treaty, compared to that under the START-1 treaty, may amount to 80,000-90,000 million roubles within a decade.

An estimate of the military-strategic balance is based on the comparison of the countervailing and deterrent potentials of the ICBMs and the SLBMs of the sides.

Under the START-2 Treaty, Russia's countervailing potential is reduced by half due to the elimination the MIRVed ICBMs, whereas the analogous potential of the U.S. offensive forces is reduced by a factor of 4-5. As a result, the ratio of the sides' countervailing potentials changes from 3.5-1 under the START-1 Treaty (in favour of the U.S.) to 1.4-1 under the START-2 Treaty.

The ratio of deterrent potentials is the most important for strategic stability. Despite the deep cuts under the START-2 Treaty, the deterrent potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces even increases as compared with the provisions of the START-1 Treaty, primarily resultant of strategic missile forces.

Russian Commentaries Critical of START II Treaty

Said To Lessen Strategic Stability

*MK0502130593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Feb 93 p 4*

[Oleg Georgiyev "Opinion" article: "START II Has No Parallels. But It Offers Plenty of Grounds for Criticism"]

[Text] The decision on the complete elimination of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) appears highly dubious. Throughout the existence of the Soviet Union's strategic missile forces, land-based missiles formed the basis of its strategic might. Under a memorandum signed in connection with the START I Treaty, ICBMs account for about 64 percent of the total number of strategic nuclear weapons, with MIRVed ICBM's accounting for 58 percent. There are no grounds for thinking that these figures have changed substantially in recent times. Consequently, in the next 10 years Russia will lose more than half its strategic nuclear potential, which was created at the cost of tremendous efforts by the entire people over several decades.

The predominant reliance on land-based ICBMs in the structure of our strategic forces is no accident. It was determined not only by historical and economic factors, but also by geostrategic conditions. Russia is basically a continental state with a very small number of ice-free basing facilities guaranteeing the possibility of missile-armed submarines putting to sea year-round. Those facilities that exist are under close American scrutiny. In this connection a recent incident springs to mind, when there was a collision between a submarine of ours and an American one which was on a reconnaissance mission in our territorial waters. There are also other reasons why sea-based missile forces play a less important role in Russia's strategic nuclear forces. One could cite, in particular, the relatively small potential for their production, servicing, and maintenance; the considerably lower proportion of submarines on patrol

at any given time than is the case for the United States; the U.S. superiority in matters of waging antisubmarine warfare; and finally the higher cost of building and operating a missile-armed submarine compared with the same number of land-based missiles as the submarine would carry.

People say that stationary MIRVed ICBM's are the most destabilizing weapons, because by virtue of their invulnerability coupled with their considerable combat capabilities—each missile can destroy several targets—they create the desire, in a crisis, to use them before they can be destroyed, and this, it is said, gives rise to the danger that each side will decide to inflict a first strike so as not to lose these "valuable" missiles. Evidently this reasoning contains an element of truth, but not the whole truth.

It is common knowledge that MIRVed ICBMs stationed at hardened launch silos possess the utmost combat readiness, and their command posts are equipped with communications and command-and-control systems that ensure that combat signals and commands are reliably conveyed to those who have to execute them. As a result there is no pressing reason necessarily to use these missiles in the first (preemptive) strike. They can be launched when information on the other side's missile launches has been received from the warning systems, checked, and confirmed, but while the missile warheads are still in flight and have not reached their targets. In this case it follows that stationary MIRVed ICBM's possess a mighty potential to deter the other side from ill-considered actions, and that they can be regarded not only as a destabilizing factor, but also as a highly effective stabilizing factor.

Another point. Since the commitment on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons retains its force for the Russian Federation as successor to the USSR, with regard to its MIRVed ICBMs arguments about their highly destabilizing role are of a purely theoretical, not a practical, nature.

People also say that by the year 2003 Russia will not have any MIRVed ICBMs anyway, because the guaranteed life of the missiles presently on duty will have expired by then and the manufacture of new missiles is deemed inexpedient in the light of the developing economic situation and the fact that the manufacturing base for a several of these missiles is in Ukraine. It is concluded from this that Russia's consent to the complete elimination of MIRVed ICBMs is only a reflection of the natural process of such missiles "dying out." But this is stretching a point too.

Missile building in our country has seen several examples of the original guaranteed service life of missile technology being extended considerably on the basis of experience in operation and comprehensive checking while in service. With regard to MIRVed ICBMs, for some reason, the possibility of this approach is not even being considered. Nor is anything said about the fact that the renunciation of MIRVed ICBM's does not mean that ICBM production will cease in Russia—it is envisaged that the manufacture of RS-12M (SS-25) single-warhead missiles will continue. And while we are talking about economic matters, it is worth pointing out that in terms of "cost effectiveness" MIRVed ICBMs are superior to all the other strategic systems.

The package of decisions on heavy bombers also prompts serious concern. On the one hand, an agreement has been reached which meets our interests, namely counting, on a heavy bomber, the number of nuclear weapons with which it is actually equipped. On the other hand, it is permitted to have up to 100 heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but which have been "converted for the fulfillment of nonnuclear tasks." In view of the fact that in reality only the American side can take advantage of this opportunity, if necessary the United States could, rapidly and with no additional expenditure, increase its nuclear potential by 1,600-2,000 weapons on the basis of heavy bombers alone. If you take into account that long-range sea-based nuclear cruise missiles and American forward-based nuclear systems remain outside the SALT II Treaty's sphere of operation, the U.S. superiority appears even more formidable.

In connection with the large-scale reductions and radical structural reorganization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces prescribed by the START II Treaty, the following questions also arise: First—will these strategic forces retain their deterrent capability, that is, will they be able to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor in a retaliatory strike, even in the most unfavorable circumstances—a surprise nuclear attack; second—will strategic stability be strengthened or weakened as a result of implementation of the treaty's provisions?

After the treaty's implementation the basis of Russia's strategic nuclear forces would be—as in the United States—nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles. Unlike the United States, however, which has approximately two-thirds of its submarines permanently on patrol in the world's oceans, the proportion of Russia's submarines on patrol is considerably lower. And submarines in their moorings are a far more easily accessible and attractive target than dispersed, hardened ICBM launch silos. Therefore, on a surprise nuclear attack, Russia can count on using in a retaliatory strike only the few missile-armed submarines that are at sea at the moment of attack.

Under the terms of the START II Treaty mobile missile complexes would account for a significant proportion of Russia's land-based missile forces. However, under the provisions of the START I Treaty considerable restrictions are imposed on the possibility of moving them. That is, in normal conditions these complexes are based relatively close together in specific locations, and there is little reason to suppose that they (or at least most of them) could survive a surprise nuclear attack.

If you take into account that the joint U.S.-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) covers the whole of U.S. territory against bombers, including those armed with long-range cruise missiles, it becomes clear that doubts about the capability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces to inflict an effective retaliatory strike after the fulfillment of reductions under the START II Treaty are well founded.

Doubts are also aroused by unsubstantiated claims that strategic stability will be strengthened as a result of the START II Treaty's implementation. The structure and state

of Russia's strategic nuclear forces are taking a form such that the other side would have the opportunity, with a relatively small number of nuclear strikes or even without the use of nuclear weapons, to destroy a significant proportion of Russia's strategic arms. Whether this opportunity will be taken is another question, but there can be no doubt that it would be exploited as a means of exerting political pressure on any convenient occasion.

U.S. activity in the sphere of ABM defense is also continuing to adversely affect stability. In accordance with present plans, the United States will deploy in the early 2000's an ABM defense of its territory capable of intercepting about 1,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads. So a weakened retaliatory strike will present no real danger to the United States, that is to say, the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces will lose all their deterrent potential.

The recently signed treaty makes wide use of the provisions of the START I Treaty and associated documents, and this seems justified in view of the tight schedule for drafting START II. At the same time, evidence of hasty work is constantly encountered in the treaty's text. This can be seen in the insufficiently clear wording of some points; in the fact that Russia is allowed to reduce the countable number of warheads from six to one on only 105 of its RS-18 (SS-19) ICBMs; in the fact that only our heavy ICBMs are subject to compulsory destruction; and, finally, in the fact that the new treaty does not include a commitment by the sides to continue talks on further strategic offensive arms reductions. This last seems highly significant, because some people in the United States hastened to declare that the START II Treaty is a document marking the completion of U.S. and Russian efforts in the nuclear disarmament sphere.

Said To Favor U.S.

PM1202151993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 93 p 5

[V. Nikolayev report on interview with Colonel General V. Achalov, leader of the Supreme Soviet Information Analysis Group; place and date not given: "General V. Achalov: 'I Put Trust in Facts'"]

[Text] It would seem to be of some interest to know the opinion of Colonel General V. Achalov, leader of the Supreme Soviet Information Analysis Group, on the Russian-U.S. START II Treaty, especially as in the past he held the post of USSR deputy defense minister, which enables him to judge the document completely professionally.

"I have a considerable number of questions on the treaty. But the more I ponder them the fewer convincing answers I find. Under the treaty, Russia practically eliminates its most effective and comparatively cheap strategic weapon—land-based MIRVed ballistic missiles. At the same time the United States retains, albeit in a reduced form, the basis of its strategic triad—nuclear submarines and strategic aviation. Furthermore, the Americans retain an overwhelming advantage in high-accuracy weapons—sea-launched cruise missiles, which are not covered by the agreements that have been reached. Parity between strategic weapons ensured peace on the planet for almost half a century, but will one superpower's monopoly ensure it?

"It is well known that the Americans were ahead in the field of creating the SDI system and a ground-based air defense system, which the treaty does not affect either. Will the United States not become invulnerable to us 10 years after our missiles capable of penetrating this defense system have been eliminated, while simultaneously keeping itself completely impervious? Is it right that Russia is artificially tailoring the structure of its defense potential to U.S. standards—specifically aviation and submarines—starting an arms race in the same areas where the United States is known to be stronger, while we have lagged behind almost hopelessly? And can we catch up with them at all given the collapse of the economy and defense sectors? Will Russia be able to bear the expenditure on creating new types of weapons? And what, finally, will the treaty's social and ecological costs be?

"The first hearings that have taken place in the Supreme Soviet have shown that government experts do not have any serious answers to these and a lot of other and equally acute questions. One gets the impression that we are again being drawn terribly hastily into an adventure which could lead to consequences which would be even more ruinous for the country's security than the consequences of the same hasty and ill-considered Gaidarist experiments for the economy.

"Of course, if U.S. politicians' peace-loving words and assurances are to be believed, armed forces can be eliminated altogether. But I prefer to put more trust in facts and I cannot turn a blind eye to the way in which the United States is behaving peremptorily in relation to Iraq and Yugoslavia, with the provocative effrontery of a world policeman. Over 100,000 people, mainly civilians, were annihilated in Iraq. In Yugoslavia—the Americans are only just starting an armed intervention against it—the tally could also reach tens of thousands. And how many of us could die if Washington also starts dictating its will to us, while we are not in a position to defend our own interests?

"I might be accused of inflaming passions. But, as far as I know, nobody has denied the reports about NATO strategists' elaboration of operations plans for its peacekeeping forces on the former Union's territory."

Disarmament Plans Called 'Hasty, Ill-Considered'
PM1602140193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Major General (Retired) B. Surikov: "Spikes of Antinuclear Race. START II Does Not Promise Prosperity"]

[Text] While being positively disposed toward the actual idea of nuclear disarmament one should, however, beware of strategic miscalculations. One of them could be to disregard the 1972 ABM Treaty. After all, Washington remains unwilling to remember the principle of reciprocity and to assure the world community, as the Soviet Union did in 1982, that it will never start a nuclear war and will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

After the START I Treaty was signed, Pentagon strategists apparently reviewed the targets listed for priority strikes in the event of a nuclear war. They reduced the list by 3,000.

But 7,000 facilities on the former Union's territory remained in the firing line. Over 5,000 of them are in Russia.

The START II Treaty is an exclusively Russian continuation of the START I Treaty. It is envisaged that the main reductions under the START II Treaty will be achieved through cutting silo-launched MIRV missiles. The Russian Foreign Ministry's information describes these missiles as the most destabilizing element of strategic offensive weapons, allegedly encouraging the provocation of a "counterforce" or "preemptive" strike. But we have never considered preemptive plans for waging a nuclear war. Priority here belongs to the United States.

For the information of our diplomatic department, military experts have traditionally included only potentially feasible new types and systems of mass destruction weapons under the concept of "destabilizing" strategic offensive weapons.

For example, neutron weapons, the nuclear-pumped X-ray laser... The USSR has consistently sought a ban on the creation of such new weapons types and systems at the UN Geneva Arms Committee.

But if our present-day diplomat-disarmers start talking about "stability," they should first of all focus their attention on missile attack warning systems. Previously the equipment's potential was limited by the experience of the cadres maintaining this system. Nowadays we are being deprived of them. And with the Union's collapse, the warning system itself has fallen apart. Its four powerful centers are located outside Russia: one each in Latvia and Azerbaijan and two in Ukraine.

Therefore the 10 January television speech by one of Russia's senior General Staff military commanders was dictated either by cunning or the desire to lull the public. He stated that our security will not weaken given a radical cut in strategic offensive weapons, since we possess a reliable missile attack warning system.

When Russia is operating an incomplete ground-based grouping of the warning system, the likelihood of an "accidental" nuclear war happening because of imperfect space warning systems cannot be ruled out. In this regard we are still not ready to restructure our defense strategy. Although there are homegrown formulations that would make it possible to solve this problem. Specifically, by using short-wave sensors [datchiki lokalnogo deystviya]. The fact that new ideas are not being adopted once again testifies to the inadequate work done on recent treaties.

If the latest U.S. publications about the START II Treaty correspond to the facts, according to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion Moscow has gone for the worst and most extravagant option. According to available data, in order to maintain our sea-based strategic nuclear potential, the Navy can rely on six powerful Typhoon-class SSBNs, seven Delfin-class missile-armed vessels, and several Murena-class nuclear-powered submarines. Within 10 years Moscow will have to eliminate approximately two-thirds of its missile-armed submarines. It is relevant to recall that,

according to available data, the conversion of a missile-armed submarine into so-called secondary raw material, not counting expenditure on burying powerful nuclear reactors, costs 5 million rubles in 1984 prices. How much will it cost today? Furthermore, Russia does not possess the requisite number of safe storage facilities for storing nuclear reactors removed from SSBNs.

A severalfold reduction in ground-based strategic nuclear potential will also necessitate large expenditures.

Many things testify to the extremely hasty, ill-considered, and ill-prepared way in which we are disarming. Look no further than the irrational destruction of expensive military facilities. We have already observed on television the blowing up of an ICBM silo. The question is, why destroy expensive facilities? Engineer structures can be retained and used for peaceful purposes.

Evidently all this should be critically examined one more time. Obviously, it is necessary to set up, under the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's auspices, a special working group of experts which could prepare within a short time span a draft special program to carry out disarmament while complying with our security and taking Russia's economic potential into account.

I think that the working group could submit:

- justification for an optimal plan for the gradual destruction and utilization for peaceful purposes of systems within the nuclear triad of strategic offensive weapons according to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion;
- an analysis of the operational capabilities of Russia's strategic nuclear potential while it is being reduced and given a lowering of the specifications and performance characteristics of Russia's missile attack warning system;
- ways of ensuring Russia's ecological safety in contemporary conditions given the presence of a real threat of terrorist acts and accidents;
- an assessment of the level of threat to Russia's national security caused by the work being carried out in the United States on a global ballistic missile defense system, Washington's refusal to pledge not to be first to use nuclear weapons, and the Americans' continued holding of nuclear tests, which carry the risk that new destabilizing methods of armed struggle will appear;
- justification for key areas to use hardware acquired in the process of cutting strategic offensive weapons for peaceful purposes;
- proposals on increasing social protection for servicemen in strategic offensive weapons units;
- recommendations on key provisions of the START II Treaty which require additional correction.

Apart from Russian Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry representatives, the interdepartmental special working group could include the creators of the nuclear triad's weapons, military experts who have studied strategic planning questions, USSR Foreign Ministry diplomats with vast

experience of holding talks and solving disarmament problems, and representatives of CIS nuclear countries who have a stake in seeing that these countries' interests are taken into account during the ensuing radical reduction in nuclear forces.

U.S. Said To 'Trick' Moscow

PM1602163593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Viktor Starodubtsev: "U.S. Count Not Similar to Russian Count. Russian Foreign Ministry's Strange Arithmetic"]

[Text] The START II Treaty is apparently a further development of the Soviet-U.S. START I Treaty signed in 1991. Both documents should therefore be considered together.

Both sides' specialists quite clearly conceived that the START I Treaty can only theoretically be regarded as an agreement to cut strategic offensive weapons. For example, THE WASHINGTON POST once published the results of a calculation by U.S. experts according to which, given the limit of 6,000 nuclear weapons prescribed by the START I Treaty, if it so desired the United States could have 12,363 nuclear weapons without breaking the treaty instead of the 12,341 weapons it had before the cuts started. This is just one possible option, but not the one of greatest magnitude. A similar result would undoubtedly have been obtained had Soviet assets been counted, although in a more modest form. That is food for thought.

How did the sides arrive at such an evolution of the aims of the talks on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons? Very simply. The Americans did not want to cut their superior strategic aviation. Having thought about it, they proposed that each heavy bomber equipped for several (from four to 20 and more) nuclear bombs or air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 km be considered as carrying only one nuclear weapon to be counted toward the maximum limit of 6,000 nuclear weapons. And that heavy bombers capable of carrying between 12 and 20 cruise missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 km be considered as carrying only 10 such missiles.

The trick worked; the Soviet side agreed with this fictitious count. Consequently 574 U.S. bombers, actually equipped for 6,832 nuclear weapons, started being considered as carrying only 2,353 weapons. Using the same approach the Soviet Union, with 162 heavy bombers, was able to count only 855 units instead of an actual 1,776 weapons toward the 6,000 maximum limit. There is, however, no need to say in whose interest this charade was played.

But this is not the only trick pulled by the U.S. side. The other was associated with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). By the end of the START I talks the extent to which these weapons were effective when hitting strategically important ground targets was proved not only theoretically but also by the practice of the war in the Persian Gulf region. Nonnuclear SLCMs were used there. Had they been nuclear missiles, which are capable of ranges of between 2,500 and 3,000 km and whose weapons yield is greater than 10 Hiroshimas, the effectiveness would have been much

greater. Therefore the Soviet side initially insisted on banning SLCMs (while there were still few of them in the arsenal) or on strictly limiting their number along with other types of strategic offensive weapons (ICBMs and SLBMs). The United States, evidently counting on superiority in this type of strategic offensive weapon, completely refused to limit them. In the end they would agree only to "politically binding" statements declaring the sides' current plans to deploy SLCMs (there must be no more than 880 of them) being made outside the treaty's framework. And that was all.

The policy concerning the ABM Treaty is remarkable. During the START I talks the United States, which previously recognized and supported this treaty, maybe to a greater extent than the Soviet Union, began to advocate the scrapping of its basic provisions. They did not conceal that the ABM Treaty stood in the way of the SDI program adopted by them. This difficult question was ultimately solved on the basis of a unilateral declaration by the Soviet side that, should one of the sides break the ABM Treaty or withdraw from it, the other would consider such an act to have jeopardized its supreme interests and could use its right to denounce the START Treaty.

That is how the United States protected its strategic programs. But that is only the half of it. The other half consisted of weakening one's partner. Here their proposals were concentrated on ICBMs, which were traditionally the basis of Soviet strategic forces. The United States took a line favoring priority limitation of ICBMs from the very beginning of the dialogue on strategic weapons. But the U.S. side made a real frontal attack on ICBMs during the START II Treaty's elaboration. In the treaty's initial version the United States proposed that the sides' ICBMs be cut to a level of 500 units, with all remaining missiles having to be single-warhead. Had this and other accompanying proposals been implemented, the proportion of ICBM warheads (60-65 percent in USSR strategic nuclear forces) would have been cut by up to 14-17 percent in Russian strategic forces.

It is clear that, if the United States was trying to get its proposal on ICBMs adopted it was to ensure that, given parity in this type, it had superiority in all other types of strategic offensive weapons through better technologies and better basing conditions. Consequently the strategic balance between Russia and the United States must be dramatically changed in the sphere of U.S. superiority.

Judging from published documents the START II Treaty, bearing in mind its deadlines and phased stages and the opportunity to use vacated silos to deploy single-warhead ICBMs, apparently enables Russia to have, within the framework of limitations, a strategic nuclear forces structure that largely meets the twin objectives of "deterrence" and economy in maintaining them.

To some extent it has apparently also been possible to rectify the START I Treaty's injustices concerning the counting of heavy bombers' weapons. In the new treaty an understanding has been reached (Point 1, Article IV) that the "number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bomber is equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber is actually equipped." True, having

agreed to this, the U.S. side immediately found itself a new safety valve enabling it to retain a heavy bomber fleet—it stipulated the right to convert up to 100 heavy bombers into bombers designed "to carry out nonnuclear missions" and their removal from the relevant aggregate limits on strategic offensive weapons. This conversion ruse little resembles limitation of, let alone a reduction in, strategic offensive weapons.

Another cunning move was the U.S. side's proposal enshrined in the START II Treaty on the possibility of converting certain MIRVed ICBMs into single-warhead ICBMs. This conversion does not require the old platform's destruction. It is simply a question of reducing the number of warheads. But here is a question: Could the removed warheads not be returned to their former place with the same ease? On the whole, if the START I and START II Treaties are implemented in the same form in which they have been signed, the U.S. side obtains an appreciable military-strategic advantage. The ability to "deter" anyone from the desire to dictate decisions unacceptable to the country is a measure of the "permissibility" of such an advantage.

The United States is confident of retaining its "deterrent potential." What about Russia? The unresolved state of two major problems prevents this question from being answered affirmatively.

First, antimissile defense problems. One can hardly talk seriously about protection from unexpected aggression if, given the considerable strategic offensive weapons reductions envisaged by the START II Treaty, the U.S. side is going to continue work on the implementation of the SDI program (the creation of the country's antimissile defense). Meanwhile there is not a single word about the ABM Treaty in either the treaty's text or the statements connected with its signing.

Second, there is no justification whatever for ignoring the SLCM problem. Neither is it mentioned anywhere in connection with the START II Treaty. An entire type of strategic weapons, whose uncontrolled deployment could turn the logic of balanced cuts into chaos, has deliberately been left outside the framework of limitations.

It is logical to draw the following conclusion: Before setting about ratification of the START II Treaty all its provisions ought to be carefully studied and the unfinished questions ought to be agreed on with the U.S. side. There is time for this. There is hardly any point in ratifying the START II Treaty in conditions when the START I Treaty has not entered into force. But even if the START I Treaty does enter into force, there are no grounds for rushing the START II Treaty. After all, the sides can begin new cuts only after the START I Treaty's provisions have been implemented.

Reports on Belarusian Ratification, Implementation of START I

U.S. Official Comments

*WS0802135593 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1100 GMT 5 Feb 93*

[Text] Washington—The report from Belarus was called good news by the official representative of the U.S. State

Department Richard Boucher. At the briefing held on 4 February at the State Department he stated: the Supreme Soviet of Belarus has ratified the treaty on strategic offensive arms and voted for joining the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms among nonnuclear states. The United States has greeted this phenomenon which is another step in the development of relations between the two countries. We are looking forward to cooperation with Belarus in the implementation of the START I treaty.

Belarusian Foreign Minister Comments

WS0502160493 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian
1435 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka has assessed the unanimous decision of the legislature in ratifying a number of international agreements as an expression of Belarus' consistent course toward a nuclear-free and neutral status. The documents included the agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons (START I) concluded on 31 June 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol signed on 25 May 1992. Belarus also decided to ratify the agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

"The results of voting showed that a vast majority of all factions supports this course," noted P. Kravchanka at a meeting with the heads of the diplomatic missions in Minsk. He said: "A sovereign state refused to possess nuclear weapons for the first time in international history. Belarus has the right to expect support from other states for its peaceful aspirations and the desire to contribute to the strengthening of European and world security."

The foreign minister expressed the hope that the world community, realizing Belarus' unprecedented move, will render practical assistance in implementing the ratified agreements. [Words indistinct] will be present on its territory for the time being. [Words indistinct] the functioning of a special communication line—a singular information "bridge" between Minsk and Washington, and also the installation of a special system for controlling the export of nuclear materials through the territory of Belarus.

P. Kravchanka placed emphasis on Belarus' logical and balanced approach toward disarmament and requested the diplomats to forward this information to the heads of their governments and to foreign ministers.

"We were extremely honest in fulfilling our obligation. We wished to persuade your countries that there are no reasons for doubting Belarus' honesty. Our Republic is expecting a similar approach from other countries," said the foreign minister in conclusion.

Russia To Accelerate Nuclear Forces Pullout

OW0502184893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1821 GMT 5 Feb 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin and edited by Boris Grishchenko—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Belarus and Russia have reached the preliminary agreement on "considerable acceleration of the withdrawal

of the strategic nuclear forces from Belarus", Shushkevich's chief defence adviser and head of the parliamentary commission for national security, defence and crime prevention, Mechislav Grib, announced during a press conference on Thursday [4 February], commenting on the unanimous ratification of the package of documents ensuring the nuclear-free status of Belarus.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: During the closed meeting on Thursday, the parliament ratified the START-I treaty and its protocol, as well as the 1968 treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the Russian-Belarusian treaty on the coordination of military activity and the Russian-Belarusian agreement on the strategic forces temporarily located in Belarus. The last two treaties were signed in August 1992.

Belarusian Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy, who took part in the press conference, said that his ministry fully supported the first three documents. He said, however, that heated debates flared up in the Belarusian parliament over the Belarusian-Russian agreement on the strategic forces located in Belarus, because this agreement has to do with the Belarusian economic interests. He accepted criticism of his ministry and said that "he will not allow illegal imports of military property from Belarus." Ratification was so much needed because new Russian-Belarusian agreements, developing the previous ones, are being drafted already, he said. The drafts specify the schedule and procedure of removing the strategic forces from Belarus, and defines ways of compensating Belarus for the material damage inflicted on it.

Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka noted that "Belarus has confirmed its nuclear-free status voluntarily and in a civilized way". Speaking about the implementation of Russian-Belarusian agreements, he stated that Belarus would like to obtain hard currency from Western states that would allow it to ensure nuclear security during the withdrawal of the strategic forces. "We do not lay claims on control over the weapons located in our republic, but we must create a system that would guarantee the non-use of these forces," he said. In his opinion, the control system might be financed by the Western states concerned. He also pointed out that the strategic armaments must be withdrawn from Belarus before January 1, 2000. "This is the deadline," he said. "Our people and parliament wish to have the nuclear weapons removed earlier," he added.

IF Note: At the end of January Shushkevich told INTERFAX that it would be useless to lay claims on a share of the sum, allocated by the U.S. Congress to the elimination of the strategic weapons in the former Soviet Union within the START-I treaty. This position is welcomed in the U.S. Congress, he said. He also added with reference to the results of Senators Lugar's and Nunn's visit to Belarus, that given the Belarusian approach to nuclear disarmament, the U.S. was ready to give technical aid to Belarus.

Minister: No Claims to Uranium Components in Missiles

WS0902090693 Minsk RID in Russian 1138 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Text] Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka said at a meeting with journalists that Belarus had no claims to the physical possession of uranium components found in strategic nuclear missiles (72 in all) which were still deployed on its territory. At the same time, Belarus is planning talks with Russia in February concerning the compensation for products containing uranium. According to P. Kravchanka, this sum can reach hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.

Russia Hails Ratification

LD0802104693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0915 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Feb—A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry has described the Belarus Supreme Soviet's recent decision to ratify the START I treaty and the Lisbon Protocol of 23 May 1992, which is part of the treaty, as a major contribution to nuclear disarmament. In light of a commitment made under the Lisbon Protocol, the Belarus Parliament also decided that the Republic of Belarus would accede to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

These important steps on the part of Belarus, the Russian diplomat said in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, "help to strengthen the system of nuclear non-proliferation, international security and, it goes without saying, the security of CIS states." According to the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, Belarus' ratification of the START I Treaty gives grounds for hoping that the treaty will soon join those international agreements that are already in force. As we know, the treaty has already been ratified by Russia, Kazakhstan, and the United States. However, a similar decision has not yet been made by Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

Belarusian, Ukrainian Attitudes Contrasted

PM0902102193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 93 p 2

[Vladimir Mikheyev report: "Minsk Has Ratified START I Treaty and as a Result Kiev Has Been Dubbed the 'Laggard'"]

[Text] It was expected that they would not only break a few lances over the ratification of the first strategic arms reduction treaty (START I) in the Belarusian parliament, but would also surround it with a palisade of amendments. But these expectations were not borne out: After a 4-hour closed session, deputies voted for START I and at the same time for accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Thereby Belarus reaffirmed its principled choice as a nonnuclear power.

The decision on this was adopted, in the words of Belarus Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko, "freely, consciously, and in a civilized manner."

Admittedly, during the businesslike debate all sorts of proposals were voiced: to postpone the ratification until guarantees are received that the remaining nuclear states will pay "compensation"; to demand that Russia bear part of the cost of providing housing and work for the servicemen due to be demobilized in this connection; to stipulate Minsk's full control of the process of the withdrawal from the republic of 72 missiles with nuclear warheads, and so forth.

Eventually the pragmatic approach prevailed, as shown in October last year in the defense doctrine that was adopted, reducing the period of implementation of SALT I from the proposed 7 years to 2.

The republic has received \$7 million from the United States and is counting on an extra financial injection to carry out the transition to the status of a nonnuclear state. In Minsk they are sure that this will be backed up by guarantees of security. The Clinton administration, according to State Department spokesman R. Boucher, has received the Belarus parliament's decision on SALT I and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a "positive step in the development of cooperation between the two countries."

At the same time the State Department spokesman recalled in this context that Ukraine is the last of the former Soviet republics and "delay in the approval of both treaties" has been observed there. "We are still worried about this," R. Boucher stated.

The probability that Kiev will submit the question of the ratification of the SALT I agreement to deputies' hearings has diminished since Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian parliament's foreign affairs committee, called these expectations "unrealistic." Economic difficulties and the dispute with Russia over the Crimea were cited as the reasons for the "delay."

Western news agencies recall in this context that Kiev considers the \$175 million allocated by the Americans insufficient "compensation" for the removal of the 176 strategic missiles from Ukrainian territory.

It is hard to judge what psychological effect the Belarus parliament's decision will have on Ukraine. Even though Western commentators, apparently through an inexplicable inertia, are calling Belarus a "conservative republic," the latter is entering the international community more smoothly and without complications. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that antinuclear feelings in Belarus are based on the bitter memory of the Chernobyl tragedy.

Admittedly, Chernobyl was an upheaval for all three Slav republics and the level of radioactive contamination is not directly proportionate to the pragmatism in state policy. But each republic has its own priorities and national interests which must be respected in any event. But that does not remove the fact that in Washington's eyes Kiev is the "laggard."

Shushkevich Speaks With Clinton

LD1002180793 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1705 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Report by BELINFORM correspondent Sergey Zayats for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, 10 Feb—Assessing the results of his telephone conversation with Bill Clinton at a briefing today, Stanislav Shushkevich, the head of the Belarusian parliament, noted that the conversation had been occasioned by the results of the work of the Belarusian parliament, which had ratified the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons, the Lisbon protocol to it, and also the decision on Belarus's accession to the nuclear weapons Nonproliferation Treaty.

Answering a correspondent's question, the head of the Belarusian parliament again confirmed the republic's intention to reduce the 7-year period for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the republic's territory to 2.5 years.

Further Details on Conversation

OW1002180493 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1742 GMT 10 Feb 93

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin and edited by Boris Grishchenko—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday [9 February] evening, Chairman of the Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich and U.S. President Bill Clinton had a telephone conversation on the White House's initiative. The Belarusian parliament's spokesman Aleksandr Krizhanovskiy told INTERFAX [IF] that on his own behalf and on behalf of the American people, the U.S. president praised the Belarusian parliament's steps to ensure the nuclear-free and neutral status of Belarus. To quote Krizhanovskiy, Clinton welcomed the ratification of the START-1 treaty and of the Lisbon Protocol by the Belarusian parliament on February 4, 1993. He also highly estimated the fact that Belarus has joined the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. president assured the Belarusian leader that the U.S. will provide Belarus with security guarantees. He also stated that in addition to the financial aid within the Nunn and Lugar law, the U.S. will give Belarus additional support in implementing the above-mentioned treaties. Clinton informed Shushkevich that he had instructed experts to hold consultations on these problems at the level of foreign ministries.

The two leaders also discussed ways of broadening economic and cultural cooperation. Clinton expressed the wish to continue the dialogue at the summit level.

Shushkevich confirmed his state's policy of neutrality and commitment to work for the attainment of a nuclear-free status. He also said that Belarus was determined to contribute to the cause of peace and security, and expressed great interests in broadening friendly and mutually advantageous relations between Belarus and the U.S. Shushkevich

emphasized that in Belarus the interests of foreign investors were adequately protected by the law.

Speaking about Belarusian-American humanitarian cooperation, Shushkevich expressed the wish to broaden contacts with the United States' Belarusian community. The two leaders pledged to maintain a permanent and diversified dialogue.

According to diplomatic sources, the White House was satisfied with the telephone talks. The officials who were present in the Oval Office during the telephone conversation noted that Clinton was pleased with the content and tone of the talks.

Aleksandr Krizhanovskiy also said that Shushkevich highly estimated the talks with President Clinton, describing them as "extremely useful for broadening relations between the Republic of Belarus and the U.S."

IF Note: The talks between Shushkevich and Clinton lasted for about 30 minutes.

Further Shushkevich Comment

LD1002224293 Moscow *Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino*
Television First Program Network in Russian 2100 GMT
10 Feb 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Meanwhile, Shushkevich, the head of the Belarusian parliament, talked to Clinton, the current U.S. President, by telephone. Clinton welcomed Belarus's consistent policy aimed at achieving the status of a nuclear-free and neutral state. [Video shows a group of reporters interviewing Shushkevich.]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Aleksey Zhuk] Is it a question of ratifying the START treaty?

[Shushkevich] Yes, I would say that as a result of the very serious and lengthy discussion, very serious work in commissions, and analysis of opponents' speeches, we have come to the conclusion that we accept these documents without any reservations, we are acceding to the Lisbon protocol, and we declare that, as a non-nuclear power, we are acceding to the 1968 nuclear weapons Nonproliferation Treaty.

[Zhuk] Did the United States promise to provide assistance with disarmament matters, that is, with arms reduction?

[Shushkevich] I would say that we have not laid down any preconditions, especially for the United States, a great power. But precisely the United States, through the mouth of Mr. President, has declared that it gives us nuclear guarantees. [end recording]

Foreign Policy 'Important' to Clinton

WS1102130893 Minsk *BELINFORM in Russian*
1246 GMT 11 Feb 93

[Text] At a briefing held on 10 February, Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Council, commented on his conversation with U.S. President Clinton.

S. Shushkevich noted that the call had been occasioned by the results of the work of the Belarusian legislature which ratified the agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, the Lisbon Protocol, and the agreement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. There were many different proposals on how to resolve these issues. Some deputies maintained that with the loss of the "nuclear shield," Belarus would also lose its international prestige and respect. Others proposed to lay in a store of international guarantees in advance. The third group, the most numerous one, tried to preserve the chosen course toward a nuclear-free and neutral state which was stated in the declaration. Time showed that this "highly moral policy" gave the best results.

Stanislav Shushkevich stressed that the journalists' forecast that the new course of the new President was a U.S. domestic problem turned out to be incorrect. Continuity of foreign policy is very important to Bill Clinton. That is why most of the 15-minute conversation was devoted to the solution of presidential issues: strategic arms and world security. Bill Clinton's assessment of the positive role performed by the Belarusian legislature was high. The U.S. response was nuclear guarantees for Belarus. This will help shield Belarus from the threats of other nuclear powers. Stanislav Shushkevich was convinced that this would not happen.

The head of the Belarusian legislature repeatedly confirmed Belarus' intention to reduce the period for withdrawing nuclear arms from its territory from 7 to 2 and a half years.

Kravchanka, Warren Christopher To Discuss START I

*LD1002184993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1749 GMT
10 Feb 93*

[By BELINFORM correspondent Tatyana Khryapina for TASS]

[Text] Minsk February 10 TASS—Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka will meet with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in March in accordance with an agreement reached by Belarusian Parliamentary Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Kravchanka and Christopher will discuss issues connected with the implementation of the START-I strategic arms reduction agreement in Belarus, the Lisbon Protocol to the agreement and the non-proliferation treaty. They are also expected to discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation between Belarus and the United States.

The date of the meeting has yet to be set.

Shushkevich Admits Dissent Exists

*LD1202092193 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Feb 93 pp 1, 3*

[Igor Sinyakevich report: "United States Guarantees Belarus Nuclear Security. Telephone Conversation Between Bill Clinton and Stanislav Shushkevich"]

[Text] In the evening of 9 February, at the initiative of the White House incumbent, a telephone conversation took

place between Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, and U.S. President Bill Clinton.

According to the Supreme Soviet press service's official account, the U.S. President, on his own account and on behalf of the American people, saluted the chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet and the parliamentarians for their consistent steps toward Belarus acquiring the status of a neutral and nuclear-free state. Bill Clinton rated highly the Belarusian Supreme Soviet's ratification on 4 February this year of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the Lisbon protocol thereto, and also the decision on the accession by the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The U.S. President assured the Belarusian leader that the United States will provide the republic with security guarantees.

Apart from financial aid under the Nunn-Lugar Act, readiness was expressed to give Belarus additional support in tackling the problems associated with the practical fulfillment of its commitments under the aforementioned treaties. Bill Clinton informed Stanislav Shushkevich of his intention to hold consultations on these matters at the level of foreign policy departments.

According to well-informed sources, during the conversation, which lasted about 20 minutes, agreement was reached on a meeting in March 1993 between U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and Belarusian Foreign Minister Kravchenko.

It has become known from Belarusian diplomatic sources in Washington that the White House is entirely satisfied with the conversation. Those who were present in the Oval Office at the time note that Bill Clinton is also pleased with the fact of the conversation and its content and tone.

On 10 February Stanislav Shushkevich met with a small group of journalists. The Belarusian leader stated that "the 7-year period of withdrawal of nuclear forces from the republic's territory is the maximum limit laid down in international agreements. We will seek to reduce it to 2 and a half years." The Supreme Soviet chairman noted that he considers fears about the vulnerability of mobile nuclear missiles in Belarus to possible theft to be unfounded. Answering your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's question on whether there are political forces in Belarus which hold a different view from the official one on nuclear policy, Stanislav Shushkevich replied in the affirmative but declined to name these forces. "We had different approaches. We sought to maintain the proclaimed course of seeking nuclear-free status. But there were many comments to the effect that in that case people would not take any notice of us, that we would not have any clear guarantees, and so forth. As a result of lengthy discussion in parliament and thorough scrutiny in the Supreme Soviet commissions and Presidium, after listening to our opponents' arguments, we reached the decision unreservedly to ratify the START I Treaty and the Lisbon protocol and to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nuclear-free state. We set no preliminary

conditions, but the United States, in the person of the President, has stated that it will give us nuclear guarantees. This great nuclear power understands the correctness of our steps and will protect us from threats by nuclear states should the need arise. My conversation with Bill Clinton yesterday shows that a policy of high morality gets the best results."

It is extremely important that even Stanislav Shushkevich himself confirmed reports that there are those in the Belarusian leadership who propose that nuclear disarmament should not be hurried. So the Belarusian parliament's virtually unanimous approval of the aforementioned documents was largely dictated merely by the desire to avoid an international scandal. It is hardly likely that those deputies who are opposed to nuclear disarmament underwent a sincere change of heart during the parliamentary hearings.

Ukrainian, British Leaders Discuss START I

Kravchuk To Seek Security Guarantees

OW0802174593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1731 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "I cannot see any deviations from the non-nuclear course proclaimed by Ukraine", Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told British journalists today. The interview was given in the run-up to his visit to London scheduled for February 9.

The president said that the START-I and the non-proliferation treaties were being prepared for ratification. Kravchuk said that it was "the right of deputies to thoroughly examine all articles of the document and analyze all possible effects of its ratification." The president believes that the most important question is safety guarantees to Ukraine from the nuclear states, the USA in the first place. Kravchuk said that his country would "if Britain becomes a safeguard of Ukraine's security, his country will only welcome such a decision." [sentence as received]

UK Hopes Ukraine Will Ratify

LD0802201793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1919 GMT
8 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Sidorov]

[Text] London February 8 TASS—The ratification of the START-I Treaty by Ukraine will be discussed specially during President Leonid Kravchuk's visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which is due to begin on Tuesday [9 February], a British Foreign Office official said here today.

The Foreign Office man expressed hope that Ukraine would promptly follow the example of Belarus, whose parliament approved the treaty last week and joined the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Major, Kravchuk Meet

LD1002182593 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English
1737 GMT 10 Feb 93

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION lobby correspondent Sarah Womack]

[Text] John Major today said the security of Ukraine would be strengthened if it could meet its non-nuclear undertakings.

His remarks came at a Downing Street lunch held in honour of Leonid Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president.

President Kravchuk's meeting with the prime minister was the first with a leader of another nuclear power since Ukraine's parliament failed to uphold a pledge to ratify the START-I disarmament accord by the end of last year.

Mr. Major said President Kravchuk was having to "grapple with some crucial issues" in particular Ukraine's intention to become a non-nuclear weapon state.

"We welcomed your statement of intent," he told him. "I recognise the difficulties against the uncomfortable certainties of the past and the disturbing uncertainties of the future." "It is our belief that Ukraine's security will be stronger if Ukraine can meet its non-nuclear undertakings. That will be the basis of a true partnership with the democracies of the free world including the European Community," Mr. Major added.

START-I provides for the transfer to Russia for destruction of 176 former Soviet missiles currently on Ukrainian territory. Ratification is necessary for Russia and the United States to proceed with the more ambitious START-2 pact signed last month.

Later, Downing Street said President Kravchuk "recognised his commitment to ratify START-I and to accede to the non-proliferation treaty".

Ukraine has said it needs security guarantees from other nuclear states, plus cash to compensate for the loss of expensive nuclear materials, and help finance the clean-up of missile sites.

However, Britain and the U.S. have already offered Ukraine "positive nuclear assurances" that Ukraine will not be targeted or threatened by the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, an agreement covering Britain's intention to provide technical assistance through the Know How Fund for the support of economic, political and administrative reform was signed by Overseas Aid Minister Baroness Chalker and Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk.

Kravchuk on Russian 'Threat'

LD1102225693

[Editorial Report] London BBC Television Network in English at 2230 GMT on 10 February broadcasts its "News-night" program which carries a 10-minute report from correspondent Mark Urban in London during which he interviews Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on the

situation in the Ukraine. Kravchuk answers in Ukrainian with superimposed English translation.

Kravchuk continues: "If Russia is a threat, then it's not only a threat to Ukraine. If Russia becomes a threat and in principle this could happen with any state if chauvinists and nationalists patriots gain the upper hand, and if in this state there is a departure from the democratic process to other methods then this is not only a threat to Ukraine, this is a threat to the whole of Europe. I would like everyone to understand this."

Urban says: "You've mentioned national chauvinism in a Russian context, but clearly there are extreme nationalists in the Ukraine as well, how far do you accept that you yourself have exploited nationalist feeling in these political conflicts with Russia?"

Kravchuk answers: "I do not support nationalist movements. I support the national idea and one cannot compare it with nationalist problems, that is important for me. Therefore we exploit national forces that are directed at progress, at the building of democracy, but we do not exploit nationalist forces and will not exploit them."

The report then shows shots of Ukraine's nuclear arms, cutting to scenes of Bush and Yeltsin ratifying START II.

Kravchuk continues: "I hope that parliament will ratify it [the START II treaty] but after ratification there will be very complex problems, the destruction of nuclear weapons, we'll need to solve a whole range of financial, organizational problems, scientific, legal problems, we'll have to do all this following ratification. We spoke about this with Prime Minister John Major and [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development President] Jacques Attali."

Urban speaks: "You've said in the past that one of the reasons you haven't ratified the treaty yet is because you want guarantees for your country's security. Where exactly do you see the threat emanating from?"

Kravchuk replies: "The threat could arise in any situation and not only from one side. The world is unstable, there are complex processes going on in Yugoslavia and there are problems, and blood is being shed in the territory of the former Soviet Union. We should take all this into account. Ukraine which has nuclear weapons on its soil, and is the third-largest nuclear power in the world agrees to destroy them. Our people have grounds for appropriate concerns, this is why we are saying that we are doing this, and we will do this, but we need the relevant guarantee."

Kravchuk Discusses Guarantees With Major

LD1002193193 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Good evening! Today is the second day of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's visit to Great Britain.

[Unidentified correspondent] British-Ukrainian negotiations took place at the official residence of British Prime Minister John Major. As a result of them, a number of joint political and economic documents were signed.

The problem of nuclear arms was one of the main issues of the bilateral negotiations. The British side is of the opinion that Ukraine must ratify the START I Treaty and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

London and Washington have already provided Ukraine with guarantees of the fact that it will not be the object of intimidation by weapons of mass destruction, and in the event of danger posed by a third state, the United States and Great Britain pledge to provide the Ukrainian side with political support.

It was specific details of these guarantees that were discussed at the meeting between John Major and Leonid Kravchuk.

Reiterates Plans To Become Non-Nuclear

LD1002230893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2100 GMT 10 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM special correspondents Viktor Demidenko and Vladimir Ivanov for TASS]

[Excerpts] London February 10 TASS—Both Britain and Ukraine are interested in security and stability in Europe and in the development of mutual beneficial cooperation, it was repeatedly stressed in the course of British Ukrainian summit talks between Prime Minister John Major and President Leonid Kravchuk, who is here on an official visit. [passage omitted]

Speaking at a lunch in honour of the Ukrainian guest John Major said that the agreement signed in London were instruments of democratic governments which give the British leadership "building materials" for extending assistance to Ukraine in economic reforms through trade and capital investments.

The British prime minister welcomed Ukraine's intention to become a nuclear-free country in the future and stressed that its security would be more reliable if it gets rid of nuclear arms. He said this would lay the foundation for honest partnership with the free world democracies, including the European Community. Major said Britain supported Ukraine's integration in European political structures. All countries are looking for friends, Major said and added that Ukraine could count on Britain's support of its efforts aimed at building a truly democratic state. [passage omitted]

The Ukrainian president reiterated his country's firm intention to become a nuclear-free power in the future. He expressed confidence that the Ukrainian Parliament would soon ratify the START-I Treaty and that Ukraine would soon join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

UK Guarantees to Ukraine

LD1102221993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2206 GMT 11 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM special correspondent for ITAR-TASS Vladimir Voronko and Viktor Demidenko]

[Text] London February 12 TASS—Britain extended to Ukraine security guarantees in order to speed up its ratification of the SALT-I [as received] Treaty and joining of the

nuclear non-proliferation treaty, visiting Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk told a meeting with British members of parliament here today.

In his view, this move will help convince Ukrainian legislators that all countries are interested in the ratification of the treaty and are ready to extend Ukraine pertinent aid in nuclear disarmament.

Addressing a press conference, Kravchuk added that the discussion of the SALT-I Treaty will take place in parliament right after it resumes work on February 16. This delay was prompted by the need thoroughly to study this document—its analysis has already been completed—and the Ukrainian people's desire to get the guarantees of their security.

Kravchuk voiced hope that parliament will solve this issue positively. Ukraine does not want to change the strategic balance of forces in the world but it needs technical and material assistance in destroying nuclear weapons. Russia faces the same financial problem.

Disarmament efforts require huge funds and 175 million dollars in financial aid promised only by the U.S. side for the present are inadequate, from his point of view. Specialists estimated that the spending on eliminating nuclear armaments approximately equals the cost of their creation.

Kravchuk said this financial aspect was not discussed with the British prime minister but it was considered during a meeting with European Bank for Reconstruction and Development President Jacques Attali and the bank agreed to set up a special fund. Following the elimination of nuclear weapons, money from this fund could eventually go to implement a project to protect the environment and social programmes.

Dwelling in greater detail on other results of the visit to Britain, Kravchuk noted that inter-state political and economic agreements signed in London will help develop British-Ukrainian relations. "We attach much importance to these bilateral ties because Ukraine has vast reserves for further cooperation in all areas," he said. This concerns particularly the conversion of enterprises in the military-production complex, power engineering, the electro-engineering industry and car manufacturing, the financial system and the agro-industrial sector. Relations with Britain are developing at different levels.

IZVESTIYA on UK Guarantees to Ukraine

*PM1602094393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Feb 93 pp 1, 3*

[Vladimir Mikheyev report: "Leonid Kravchuk Has Returned From London Without the Gold but With Guarantees of Security"]

[Text] John Major's government is interested as much as the Clinton administration in Ukraine's joining the ranks of nonnuclear states, and has officially given Kiev guarantees of security so as to accelerate the process of ratification of the START I Treaty and accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

REUTER, citing officials in London, says that these guarantees are the "standard assurances" which a nuclear power gives to a country acceding to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and proclaiming nonnuclear status. Specifically, this means that Britain will not attack Ukraine with weapons of mass destruction if Ukraine refrains from such an attack and that Britain will defend Ukraine at the United Nations if a third state attacks it.

The Ukrainian President promised that the discussion of the START I Treaty will take place right after parliament resumes work 16 February. The delay was due to the need for a comprehensive study of such difficult questions as "procedures for the destruction of nuclear weapons, destruction sites, related expenditure, the ecological effect, and ensuring security." Leonid Kravchuk noted in this regard that Ukraine does not want to change the strategic balance of forces in the world.

Confirming Ukraine's commitment to nonnuclear status in the future, the Ukrainian leader drew attention to the fact that the destruction of nuclear weapons is an expensive business, with the costs of eliminating weapons approximately equal to the costs of creating them. Since the West attaches exceptional importance to reducing the number of members of the "nuclear club," it must have an interest in giving Ukraine technical and material assistance in achieving this goal. London has not yet made any commitments. However, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has given the go-ahead to the creation of a special fund which will provide resources for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and subsequently for social programs and environmental protection.

During conversations with representatives of the Confederation of British Industry, Kravchuk informed them that a preferential regime has been introduced in Ukraine for foreign investors who are now exempt from taxation for a period of two to five years; the National Bank of Ukraine will be opening a currency exchange in the near future; and preferential terms are being created for the activity of joint ventures involving foreign capital.

Ukrainian Vice Premier Viktor Pynzenyk predicted in turn that, as soon as "macroeconomic stabilization" is achieved, the grivna will replace the ruble. It is planned to simultaneously introduce internal convertibility—first of the coupon, then of the grivna and to that end the government intends making it mandatory for all enterprises to sell to it one-half of their foreign currency earnings. The latter condition, admittedly, might alarm potential British investors.

Thus the emphasis is now being placed on cooperation and reliance on one's own efforts and not on some miraculous manna from heaven like, for example, the deposit of a few boxes of gold at the Bank of England. This is a reference to 1724, when Hetman Pavlo Polubotok sent his gold to London with some of his cossacks to prevent it from falling into Russian hands. The Hetman himself was later imprisoned by Peter I and soon died. After Ukraine gained independence 14 months ago, parliamentarians decided to

seek out these riches. The Bank of England replied that there were no written records and it did not want to delve even deeper into its archives.

It has been calculated that, if you include the accumulated interest, each inhabitant of Ukraine could expect to receive "expenses" of \$300,000. Leonid Kravchuk said that people should not get carried away with that idea and should not count on the Cossack gold. Instead he advocated a different method of earning money: "We have to work hard."

Russian Ambassador Faults Ukraine on Nuclear Arms Ownership

AU1202093693 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
9 Feb 93 p 1

[Interview with Leonid Smolyakov, ambassador of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, by Olena Hubina; place and date not given: "Ukraine Is Also a Successor With Regard to Debts"]

[Text] Hubina: [passage omitted] Can you comment upon the statement by Russia's minister of defense that all nuclear missiles on the territory of the former USSR belong to Russia?

Smolyakov: I am not aware of such a statement and believe that such a pronouncement could hardly be made at all. In the process of negotiations between our two delegations, there is a dispute on the nuclear status. When we tell Ukraine to recognize those weapons as its own, it does not agree. It would have been to our advantage if you had recognized your weapons as your property—Ukraine must deal with its property on its own. However, this creates a delicate scenario: If you recognize the weapons as your property, you must agree that you are a nuclear state. Meanwhile, time is wasted and the quantity of missiles for which the terms of warranty expire increase. There is no possibility for their maintenance. All of this is due to the fact that politicians cannot find an acceptable formula.

Hubina: Perhaps many misunderstandings are due to the fact that Russia has unilaterally declared itself as the successor state to the Union?

Smolyakov: The question of succession was never raised in a such a key as to imply we are the only successors. The very fact that we have assigned Ukraine's share of the debt amounting to 16.37 [percent], indicates that in this part Ukraine also has a right to be a successor. Why do you think that Russia has taken the entire responsibility upon itself?

Ukraine's Kravchuk Discusses START I With Germans

Interview With DER SPIEGEL

LD1502214193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2125 GMT
15 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM-TASS]

[Text] Kiev February 15 TASS—President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine spoke out in favour of concluding a treaty between Ukraine and Germany to define the principles governing relations between the two states.

He made this statement at a meeting with the founder and publisher of the DER SPIEGEL magazine Rudolf Augstein, the magazine's editor-in-chief Wolfkam Kaden and its correspondent in Kiev Martina Helmerich today. They arrived in the Ukrainian capital in connection with the opening of the magazine's representative office here.

"At the first stage we sensed that the Western world perceived first and foremost Russia and the policy towards Ukraine and other new states which formed on the territory of the former Soviet Union is pursued through the prism of Russia. We want each Western state including Germany to have its own policy towards Ukraine that would be mindful of our power's vast potential, its peace policy, the desire to be a nuclear-free state, a law-governed, democratic and civilised country, and would take into account its possibility to become a stabilising factor in Europe," Kravchuk said.

Asked by the German journalists about the ratification of the START-I Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Kravchuk answered: "We will not only destroy nuclear weapons but also reduce conventional armaments. Ukraine firmly abides by its goal of working towards gaining a nuclear-free status."

Meets German Foreign Minister

LD1602115593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 16 Feb 93

[Text] On 15 February President Leonid Kravchuk received German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who arrived in Kiev on a 2-day visit. In their talks they touched upon such issues as protection of investments, USSR debts and Ukraine's participation in their repayment, prospects for ratification by Ukraine of the START-I Treaty and its joining the nonproliferation treaty, and prospects for Ukraine's integration into general European processes.

Touching upon the START-I Treaty Leonid Kravchuk noted in particular that Ukraine does not want to change the strategic balance in the world but it needs technical and material assistance in destroying the nuclear weapons which are still situated on its territory. In connection with this, Klaus Kinkel said that Germany is prepared to provide assistance to Ukraine to resolve this problem.

He voiced gratitude to the government of Ukraine for its concern for the fate of persons of German origin who live in the republic.

During his stay in our country Klaus Kinkel will also meet with Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and Leonid Kuchma, prime minister of Ukraine, and will hold talks with his opposite number, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko.

Expects 'Early Elimination' of Warheads

LD1602070893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0636 GMT
16 Feb 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Anatoliy Grigoryev for TASS]

[Text] Kiev February 16 TASS—"We do not want that Ukraine remains a nuclear state. We want an early elimination of nuclear warheads and not their accumulation," Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said late on Monday [15 February] while meeting German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who arrived in Kiev on a two-day official visit to prepare the visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl scheduled for June.

Kravchuk added that the Ukrainian parliament did not change its attitude to the nuclear-free status.

Kravchuk and Kinkel discussed Ukrainian cooperation in the CSCE and NATO framework, the return of Germans, care for the graves of Germans killed during the Second World War and other problems of mutual interest.

Kinkel said Germany is ready to import Ukrainian-made goods and wants to open a trade mission in Kiev.

"We attribute great importance to your visit. We believe a new phase of strengthening Ukrainian-German relations is linked to it," Kravchuk said.

He and Kinkel signed agreements on mutual protection of investments, on cultural cooperation and on free travel.

Kravchuk: START I To Be Ratified Shortly

LD1602094293 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 16 Feb 93

[Text] Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany is completing his official visit to Ukraine, during which he held talks with Ukrainian leaders. For one, he brought up the issue of Ukraine's compliance with UN economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in the wake of allegations by international news agencies about Ukrainian oil supplies to Serbia and Montenegro. At his talks with Mr. Kinkel, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk refuted these allegations. Another of the West's concerns is that Ukraine has not yet ratified the START I Treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons. Leonid Kravchuk assured the minister that it would be ratified in the near future.

Ukraine's Warheads May Become 'Second Chernobyl'

PM1502210993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 93 p 4

[Viktor Litovkin article: "Second Chernobyl Brewing in Ukraine's Missile Silos"]

[Text] The IZVESTIYA editorial office has received alarming news from units of the Strategic Missile Forces stationed in Ukraine. (As is well known, Ukraine has 176 launch silos with 1,250 nuclear warheads: a total of 130 "old" liquid-fueled SS-24 systems and 46 "new" solid-fueled SS-24 systems. Both systems are MIRVed.)

Specialists of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff have yet again inspected the state of nuclear safety of those systems in the missile division stationed in the city of Pervomaysk, Nikolayev Oblast. There are 16 SS-24 missile launchers there on alert status which have overrun the scheduled inspection and maintenance date by 8 to 10

months. Another three missiles on alert status have simply been in a defective condition for 2 months.

Conditions for the safe storage of nuclear weapons [boy-ezaryady] have not been provided in the division's storage depots either. The number of warheads in one depot is three to five times above the norm. As a result the radiation background has been exceeded there and now reads almost 1,000 microrentgens per hour, which endangers the life and health of the people servicing the nuclear warheads. Moreover, the schedule for additional technical servicing [mezhhreglamentniy grafik tekhnicheskogo obsluzhivaniya] of 26 nuclear warheads on the nose sections of missile systems on alert status has been violated.

"No army in the world has seen such disorder since the appearance of nuclear weapons," I was told by one high-ranking officer, who wished to remain anonymous. "A second Chernobyl is brewing in Ukraine's missile silos, and people should know about it."

I telephoned Colonel General Ivan Oleynik, deputy defense minister of Ukraine, and asked him: "Is what the editorial office has been told true?"

He replied: "I do not comment on rumors."

I then contacted Major General Vladimir Nikitin, deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces in charge of the operation of nuclear weapons, and asked him to answer the same question.

"Unfortunately, all that is so," he answered. "I am not a politician, but as a specialist I can say that no one today will be able to give a guarantee of the complete safety of nuclear missiles in Ukraine."

According to experts, this situation arose out of the transfer of administrative command of the Strategic Nuclear Forces in Ukraine to its Armed Forces' leadership. The country assumed the commitments to carry out the full servicing of nuclear weapons and pay all operational expenditure pending a definitive solution of the question of the state affiliation of the nuclear weapons. (At 1992 prices, such a financial operation required at least 200 million rubles [R] per annum). But in practice this has not happened to date.

For example, the control system for the SS-24 missile system (or, more precisely, one of its aiming and guidance systems) can operate without scheduled servicing for more than 30,000 hours, and no more [as published]. After that it must be dismantled and replaced. The system costs around R21 million. It is produced in Kharkov, but the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has simply failed to come up with the requisite funds to pay the plant for the cost of the instruments and servicing under guarantee.

The scheduled servicing date for the aiming and guidance system on 16 launchers expired more than 1 year ago.

It is a similar story with the technical systems for the protection and defense of missile systems and their launchpads. Only by using such systems can these awesome weapons be reliably protected against undesirable visitors' penetrating the silos and command posts.

These protection systems are also produced in Ukraine, in Kirovograd. But at 20 launchpads in the vicinity of Pervomaysk the defense and protection systems have been defective for around two months. Clearly, the missile division lacks the resources to pay the Kirovograd plant to maintain the system, and the Ukrainian Defense Ministry likewise.

There are problems with checking the nose sections too. Usually, after detachment from the missile airframe, they are placed in a special container and dispatched to the plant where they were assembled, to the actual specialists who made them, or to a depot for storage. During this time the warhead is replaced by an electrical simulator so that all the systems of the unit continue to operate continuously in the prescribed controlled operating mode. The scheduled servicing of the missile itself is carried out at the same time.

But it is now virtually impossible to do this, not just because problems have arisen with transporting a nuclear device across the Ukraine-Russia border—problems which each time provoke long, agonized negotiations, the need to remove vague suspicions, and disputes over the payment of all the operating costs—but also because you cannot install a warhead that has been adjusted and checked on to a strategic missile that has not been serviced at the set times and on which, moreover, the guaranteed service life of many, many systems has expired.

And delay in dispatching each currently scheduled warhead to the plant causes wholesale disruption of the servicing schedules for other nuclear weapons awaiting their turn at storage depots and arsenals. Incidentally, such problems with guaranteeing the nuclear safety of missile systems do not exist in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

How, then, is the nuclear safety of strategic missile systems deployed in Ukraine to be guaranteed and potential calamity averted?

According to Maj. Gen. Nikitin, deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces in charge of the operation of missile weapons, after long negotiation with the Ukrainian Defense Ministry it has recently been possible partially to restore supervision of the operation of missile systems deployed in the state by the producer plants and chief designers under guarantees and patents [garantiyniy i avtorskiy nadzor]. Several dozen enterprises in all, 40 percent of them in Russia, including Moscow's Plant Named for Khrushchev, are involved in their servicing.

General Nikitin said that Russian missilemen had managed to find several million [rubles] for the most essential work at the Ukraine's launch complexes. Specialists from industry have gone to the military units of Pervomaysk and Khmel'nitskiy to put the missile systems into an appropriate state. Admittedly, the general is not absolutely sure that it will be possible to eliminate all the shortcomings in the operation of missile weapons in Ukraine.

"Too much time has been lost," he said. "Certain processes involved in the equipment have become irreversible in

nature. The only solution now is to detach immediately the unserviced nose sections and render them and the missiles in a safe state."

Moreover, Gen. Nikitin reported that the Russian Strategic Missile Forces have provided out of their own pretty meager reserves 60 percent of the scarce special materials required to ensure the essential hermetic sealing of the silo launch systems sited in Ukraine and achieve the conditions of temperature and humidity which will preclude any potential shorting in the electrical systems, with its unpredictable consequences.

The Strategic Missile Forces have ordered at a cost of R2.4 million to themselves the requisite number of missile nose-section simulators to ensure that essential monitoring of the good working order of the launch systems is ensured after the warheads have been detached. They have already been manufactured, and some of them have already been dispatched to Ukraine.

Maj. Gen. Nikitin also stated that he cannot accept full responsibility for the technical condition of missile systems deployed in Ukraine, as in the current situation he possesses no real means to change anything fundamentally regarding the maintenance of nuclear safety there. To do that, he said, it is necessary first and foremost to restore the disrupted system governing the operation of strategic missile systems, to bring scheduled servicing into line with the set timetable, and to create the necessary stocks of material resources and replacement instruments and accessories.

"Unfortunately," he said, "not everything depends on the specialists. Politics has come to outweigh nuclear safety for certain politicians."

But, in experts' opinion, the measures which the leadership of the Strategic Missile Forces are taking are hardly adequate. The political will to solve the problem of the Nuclear Missile Forces in Ukraine and their acquisition of specific state affiliation are the most important things needed.

The leadership and the financing of the missile forces should be one and should emanate from a single center. And responsibility for the safety of the Nuclear Missile Forces should be in one pair of hands. Too many cooks spoil the broth.

Russian, Ukrainian Groups Discuss START I Implementation

LD1602163993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1529 GMT 16 Feb 93

[Text] Moscow February 16 ITAR-TASS—According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian and Ukrainian working groups met today to regulate question relating to the implementation of the START-I Treaty. The working groups were set up to utilize nuclear charges within the framework of Russo-Ukrainian negotiations connected with the issue.

During today's meeting, the Russian representatives handed over to the Ukrainian side materials relating to the dismantling, transportation and elimination of nuclear charges and

strategic missile complex components of the strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine, including reprocessing of nuclear components.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Designer Views History of ABM Developments

934P0066A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 93 p 4

[Interview with retired Lieutenant General Grigoriy Vasilyevich Kisunko, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize Laureate, and corresponding member of the RAN, by Anatoliy Pokrovskiy; place and date not given: "Three Episodes From the Life of Our ABM Defense: There Is No More 'Berkut.' What Kind of Geese Will Save Moscow Now?"]

[Text] Perhaps it is true that we, and principally our "friends," were unable to get a detailed picture of the scientific-technical foundation of the Soviet Army and to single out its creators by name. But time ages both people and equipment. And history absorbs lessons that are instructive not for delayed regrets, but for mature modeling of the future. This is probably why the material published in PRAVDA on 11 December under the rubric "Interview With a Former Incognito" aroused such keen interest. The article, in particular, gave the heretofore little known name of the general designer of the antiballistic-missile defense systems A, A-35, and A-35M for the first time—retired Lieutenant General Grigoriy Vasilyevich Kisunko, a Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize Laureate, and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

First Episode

Pokrovskiy: Grigoriy Vasilyevich, the popular expression "nuclear missile shield of the country" is not entirely accurate. There is the "sword"—an attack weapon, and there is the "shield"—a defense weapon. So, which of them was forged in your KB [design bureau]?

Kisunko: The "shield," of course. During my service in the army, I was a "defender" in a direct sense of the word, starting as a private in the Leningrad People's Volunteer Corps.

Pokrovskiy: From private to lieutenant general, from the volunteer corps to the general designer of an antiballistic-missile defense system is a long road. Where did it start?

Kisunko: My fate, like that of other participants in the creation of these systems, was decided on one summer night in 1950 when the director of SB-1 [Special Bureau], Pavel Nikolayevich Kuksenko, who arrived after being summoned at 0200, and was led into Stalin's apartment by a security guard. Sitting on a sofa in his pajamas and looking over some kind of papers, the owner of the apartment received his guest. Then, shoving the papers aside, he said:

"You know that the last time an enemy aircraft flew over Moscow was on 10 July 1942. This was a single reconnaissance aircraft. But now, imagine that a single aircraft appears over Moscow, but with an atom bomb. It is clear that we need an absolutely new PVO [Air Defense] that is

capable, even under a massive raid, of not allowing even one aircraft to reach a defended target. What can you say about this problem?"

"According to our calculations, future PVO systems must be built on the basis of a combination of radars and guided 'surface-to-air' and 'air-to-air' missiles," Kuksenko answered.

After this, in the words of Pavel Nikolayevich, Stalin began to ask him "rudimentary" questions about a matter that was so unfamiliar to Stalin, which is what radio-guided missiles were at that time. Kuksenko emphasized that the scientific-technical complexity and the scale of the problems here were no less than the problems associated with the creation of an atomic weapon. After hearing him out, Stalin said:

"There is the opinion, Comrade Kuksenko, that we must start immediately to create a PVO system for Moscow that is calculated to repel a massive enemy air raid from any direction. For this reason, a special main directorate on the order of the First Main Directorate on Atomic Matters will be established under the USSR Council of Ministers."

All of this work, Pavel Nikolayevich recalled later, began to move with inconceivable speed. Stalin summoned Kuksenko to him several more times. He elicited detailed information, particularly about the capabilities of future systems to repel a "star" massive raid (simultaneously, from different directions) and a "ramming" massive raid.

A decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers assigned the code name "Berkut" [golden eagle] to the Moscow PVO system. P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beriia were appointed its chief designers. The system was kept secret even from the minister of defense. A newly created Third Main Directorate (TGU) was established under the USSR Council of Ministers as the client. For this, the TGU set up its own military delivery and official acceptance system, its own surface-to-air missile test range in the area of Kapustin Yar, and, as the facilities of the system were being established, its own military formations for the military operation of these facilities.

According to the initial concept, the "Berkut" system was supposed to consist of the following subsystems and facilities:

- two rings (inner and outer) of radar detection systems based on a radar station with a 10-centimeter band—chief designer L.V. Leonov; two rings (inner and outer) of surface-to-air missile guidance radars—chief designers P.N. Kuksenko and S.L. Beriia; the B-200's located at the stations and the surface-to-air guided missile launchers associated with them—general designer S.A. Lavochkin; chief designers: missile engine—A.M. Isayev, warheads—Zhidkikh, Sukhikh, Kozorezov, proximity fuse—Rastorguyev, onboard electric power sources—N.S. Lidorenko, transport-launch equipment—V.P. Barmin.

In 1950, I was transferred by a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers from my teaching position at the Military Communications Academy, where I was working on the electrodynamics of superhigh frequencies, to a special bureau that was headed by Kuksenko. Now it was reorganized into KB-1 [Design

Bureau-1]. In KB-1, for me personally and for my future associates on ABM problems, participation in the creation of the "Berkut" system was that school without which we would not have been able to "mature" to an understanding of these problems.

Second Episode

"Encrypted Message, Top Secret of Special Importance."

"Moscow, Presidium, CPSU Central Committee, for Comrade N.S. Khrushchev.

"We report that on 4 March 1961, in the area of Test Range A, an R-12 ballistic missile equipped with a mockup in the form of a steel plate weighing 500 kilograms, instead of a standard warhead section, was launched from the State Central Test Range of the Ministry of Defense. The resources of the A-system detected the target at a distance of 1,500 kilometers after it came over the horizon. Based on data of the Dunay-2 radar, the central computer constructed and continually refined the target trajectory, issued radar plots to precision guidance radars, calculated and issued prelaunch turn angles to the launchers, and calculated the time of launch. On a computer command, the B-1000 ABM missile was launched from launcher No. 1. At an altitude of 25 kilometers, on a computer command from Earth, the high explosive fragmentation warhead of the ABM missile was detonated, after which, according to a camera film record, the nose section of the ballistic missile started to break up into pieces... Thus, for the first time in national and world practice, the nose section of a ballistic missile was destroyed in its flight trajectory by an ABM system."

Pokrovskiy: Can you talk about the features of this system in a little more detail?

Kisunko: This was an experimental system with fully computerized automation of the operational cycle. By its appearance on the radar screen and in the computer, the target itself seemingly pressed the button for its own destruction. As soon as the missile is pinpointed, the transmission and computer data processing system goes into operation and the flight trajectory is fixed. In a word, the operational algorithm operates automatically right up to the meeting of the missile with the ABM missile and the explosion of the charge. I emphasize—nonnuclear.

Pokrovskiy: But what does it represent?

Kisunko: We called it "cherries in syrup." This is 16,000 pellets with a carbide-tungsten nucleus, a TNT filling, and a steel shell. Thus, the combined chemical and kinetic energy smashed the missile into smithereens. The Americans succeeded in demonstrating a similar result only 23 years later.

Pokrovskiy: But, apparently, they had their own system?

Kisunko: Yes, they had their experimental Nike Zeus and operational Safeguard systems in which the ABM missiles were equipped with nuclear combat charges. The Safeguard system was intended for the defense of ICBM launch silos that were engineer-protected from atmospheric nuclear bursts of the intercepting and attacking missiles. Thus, similar systems are absolutely unsuitable for the ABM defense of cities. Imagine, somewhere in the atmosphere

over Moscow, the nuclear charges of the ABM missiles defending it and the attacking missiles explode in two's. What will happen to Moscow? For it, this means nuclear hara-kiri.

By the way, the Americans, with the help of false information, tried to push us into scientific-technical dead ends. For example, as far back as 1956, a newspaper "canard" appeared that they were working on a method of destroying missiles with focused radio waves in a superhigh frequency band. They reported this to Marshal Zhukov, and he ordered that this be looked into. Then we succeeded in proving that this was physically not feasible. But in June of 1984, even a U.S. patent "High Energy Microwave System of Defense" was published in the American press. The "deza" [disinformation] worked partially, and forces, means, and what is most important, time, were spent on hopeless studies.

So that the cost of the stakes in this game are more understandable, I will recall: A situation was created in the nuclear missile confrontation in the 1950's which American Senator Taft called a nuclear stalemate. In his opinion, the country that first gained an antiballistic-missile defense will achieve a decisive strategic superiority. However, the problem of creating an ABM system capable of influencing the outcome of a large-scale exchange of nuclear missile strikes proved to be unprecedentedly complex, and it can be said that it is the most complicated among the military-technical problems of the 20th Century, and it has not yet received a strategically significant resolution. But, in addition, approximately since the 1970's, we began to fall behind the Americans in the resolution of this problem. In response to Reagan's SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], there was only the bragging statement by M.S. Gorbachev that we, he said, have the formula for an "asymmetrical variant" for reacting to the SDI program that in 10 years will be ten times and even a hundred times cheaper. While we are lulling ourselves with discussions and statements, the Americans are confidently moving ahead to a conceptual system for the unification of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

But in the ABM-I Treaty of 1972, our delegations committed astonishing "bungles." From our side, mostly politicians and bureaucrats took part in composing it, and the technical specialists remained on the sidelines. And we fell into a technical trap. One example. According to the conditions of the treaty, we can build a missile attack warning radar only on the periphery of the territory of the country. Therefore, we were forced, like guilty boys, to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar that was supposed to cover the radar "gap" in the northeastern sector of the SPRN [Missile Attack Warning System].

What is the crux of the problem here? After all, it would seem that the farther the station is from the object being defended, then the sooner the signal will come of a possible attack on it. However, the northwestern outskirts of our country contain the taiga, the tundra, and swamps. It is expensive and difficult to build there. But the borders of the United States are well-populated areas with a reliable infrastructure. In addition, the Americans already built an external network of stations in Greenland, Scotland, in

Alaska, and internally on the territory of the United States. Why were we deprived of the capability of having two defensive rings on our own territory—on the periphery and inside the country? And if you consider that with the breakup of the USSR, our ballistic missile attack warning system also broke up, ending up in different states, then it can be said that Russia's ABM defense is vulnerable because of radar "gaps."

Third Episode

Pokrovskiy: Grigoriy Vasilyevich, I know that you took part in the calculations of the possibility of defeat and a retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear conflict. This was possible to do—the text of the SALT II treaty with all of the necessary data was made public. But, on 16 January, PRAVDA carried the text of a memorandum to the treaty between Russia and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START II), which was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush. There on each line, there are only periods instead of specific numbers. How do you assess this?

Kisunko: It is no coincidence that, until the START II treaty is examined by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, it is being kept a secret from the Russian public, from the mass media, and especially from the specialists who would be able to express professional judgments about this treaty and to reveal its unacceptability to Russia.

By ratifying this treaty, Russia would relinquish its own sovereign right to direct the allocation of the number of nuclear warheads agreed to with the United States according to types of arms: ground-, sea-, and air-based.

They want to force us to dismantle and destroy the very heart of our strategic deterrence system—silo-based ICBMs with multiple warheads—under the inspection of American "helpers." These missiles, with their high readiness for immediate launch, accident-free reliability, and survivability in defense-engineered launch silos guarantee the inevitability of a retaliatory strike even in the worst case for us, when our remaining nuclear means would be destroyed by a preemptive strike by the attacking side, while the United States will have left untouched 18 submarines with multiple charge missiles carrying 1,728 warheads!

Are our strategists not haphazardly scraping up mobile railroad- and ground-based missile complexes, submarines with nuclear missiles, and all the rest of the "arithmetic" permitted us in the lines with the periods in the START II treaty? In truth, all we have not had yet are nuclear railroad catastrophes, nuclear road accidents on highways, and tragedies similar to the Komsomolets submarine. It should be kept in mind that generally when our nuclear submarines set out to sea they are immediately fixed by a U.S. global monitoring system and come under the invisible surveillance of its antisubmarine systems. Therefore, under the delivery of a disarming strike, they can be destroyed simultaneously with nonnuclear systems. In short, for Russia, START II is its nuclear disarmament under U.S. control. At the same time, I am not touching on the ruinous economic aspects of the START II treaty for Russia.

Pokrovskiy: Pardon me, but is this, as they say, steep reduction in nuclear weapons not for the blessing of all mankind? After all, this reduces the danger of a "nuclear winter" on the whole planet...

Kisunko: It depends on what objectives the contracting parties are pursuing with all of the reductions. Reagan, for example, refused to acknowledge that the ultimate objective of all reductions of offensive arms is the total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, on which the Soviet Union has always insisted. Consequently, is some kind of a maximum limit for reductions implied? Will reductions not stop at a level that is ecologically acceptable for nuclear aggression and simultaneously suitable for an ABM defense of the United States against a limited retaliatory strike. Moreover, this can be a conventional nonnuclear ABM-SDI, without any kind of outer space exotica. This means that with the decrease in the number of offensive missiles a significant strategic advantage will go to the side that has ABM superiority.

Remember what was said about the "gaps" in our ABM defense. Add to this that for us to overtake the United States in the creation of antiballistic missiles is a matter that is more expensive and takes more time than the manufacture of offensive weapons. And then those advantages that START II gives the American side will become more understandable. In short, parity is needed not only in offensive but also in defensive arms. We did not start our talk with a comparison of the "sword" and the "shield" for nothing. Given a technical violation of this balance (and even politically, probably, also), a situation is possible where one of the sides, having superiority in ABM defense, will tell the other:

"Just dismantle your 'toys' in an amicable way." And move into the ranks of nonnuclear states with all of the consequences that derive therefrom.

Is this what we want?

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuanian Defense Ministry on Russian Troop Withdrawal Progress

934K0206A Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 16 Jan 93 p 6

[Report by the National Defense Ministry of the Republic of Lithuania: "How the Russian Army Is Being Removed From the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania—Data as of January 7, 1993"]

[Text] On the basis of a report by S. Knezys, the commissioner of the Republic of Lithuania for questions of the removal of the Russian army, the National Defense Ministry of the Republic of Lithuania has distributed the following data:

At the beginning of September 1992, the Russian army on Lithuania's territory had 20-22,000 servicemen. Five divisions were stationed in Lithuania—a total of 288 individual combat units as well as service detachments, units and subunits (a part of them belonged to the above-mentioned divisions).

According to the time-table, the Russian army must be removed from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania by

August 31, 1993. Sixty-one units had to be withdrawn by the end of 1992 (first stage): 23 units belonging to the land army, one airborne, four anti-aircraft, 30 military air force, and three military fleet. Forty-seven military units were withdrawn to this day, or 78 percent of the numbers to be withdrawn by December 31, 1992, according to the time-table.

The first stage of the withdrawal of the Russian army from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania ended on December 31, 1992. The results show that the chief tasks of this stage were completed. The 107th motorized rifles division, which used to be stationed in Vilnius, Ukmerge and Pabrade, was withdrawn. So was the 119th paratroopers landing regiment from Marijampole, which belonged to the 7th airborne landing division. Also withdrawn were a large portion of the 18th transport aviation (Panevezys, Kedainiai) and the 53rd fighter bomber regiment from Siauliai with its service subunits. The withdrawal of the border guard units has been completed. All the military units and subunits are adhering to the time-table, except for the 3rd shore defense division (Klaipeda, Telsiai), the 367th individual helicopter regiment in Kaunas, and the 177th individual radioelectronic fighter aviation regiment in Siauliai.

Although the withdrawal of the military air-force has begun, it is proceeding very slowly. The military air-force units were not withdrawn at the time set in the time-table (by the end of 1992).

The withdrawal of the military sea fleet has not yet begun.

Fifty-two military objects were taken over since the signing of the time-table for the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Republic of Lithuania. The largest of such objects are: the Northern town in Vilnius, the military towns in Ukmerge, Pabrade and Marijampole. The takeover of the airports and military towns of Pajuoste (Panevezys) and Zokniai (Siauliai) has begun. The inspection of 19 objects has been completed. The transfer of such objects to the Republic of Lithuania was temporarily halted in October and, particularly, in November. The justification for this was that the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation had no agreement on the procedure of their transfer and settling up for them; it was also said that the commanders of the military units and subunits had not received a permission to do this. In December, the transfer of military objects was proceeding smoothly.

The withdrawal of Russia's military units from Lithuania is taking place in disregard of the protocol "On the Procedure of the Solution of Technical and Organizational Questions in Connection with the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Lithuania." Statements and claims dealing with the withdrawal are not presented by a commissioner of the Russian Federation but by the commanders of the military units and subunits.

Belarusian Army Official on Plans for CFE Implementation

WS1002112393 Minsk SEM DNEY in Russian 23 Jan 93 p 5

[Interview with Major General Viktor Konstantinovich Vakar, chief of the National Agency for Control and Inspection at the Belarusian Defense Ministry, by SEM DNEY

correspondent Vladimir Rudenko under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "Disarmament Is an Expensive Undertaking. But It Is Necessary...."; place and date not given—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In line with the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE], Belarus must destroy more than 1,500 tanks, over 300 infantry personnel carriers [BMP], and about 100 aircraft. This is what General-Major Viktor Konstantinovich Vakar, chief of the National Agency for Control and Inspection at the Belarusian Defense Ministry, told a SEM DNEY correspondent:

Vakar: We have three centers for the destruction of arms and military equipment as foreseen by CFE. In Borisov, at the factory for tank repair, the work is in full swing. Currently, BMPs are being dismantled there, and tanks will be the next. In Stankovo, armored personnel carriers are being dismantled. At the end of March or the beginning of April, we will start dismantling aircraft. This will be the third center called "Lesnaya." By the way, we have all the necessary technological basis there because some time ago, the equipment had been prepared for the dismantlement of launchers and medium-range and short-range missiles.

Rudenko: Viktor Konstantinovich, what is the timetable for arms reduction? Perhaps the final result is important, and not the duration of the dismantlement itself?

Vakar: No, the dismantlement time is strictly determined by the treaty. The dismantlement must be completed by November 1995. During the first calendar year, that is by 13 November 1993, we must dismantle 25 percent of the arms and equipment which are subject to dismantlement. During subsequent years, 35 and 40 percent will be dismantled, correspondingly. A year is divided into calendar periods of one to three months each. We must inform all the countries—CFE members—beforehand (15 days) about the beginning of a calendar period, its duration, and the amount of arms and equipment that will be dismantled.

Rudenko: To tell you the truth, my heart bleeds when I see how BMP's are turned into scrap iron....

Vakar: This metal is priceless. The steel armor is of a high quality. Remelting will be carried out at Zhlobin (Belarus) iron and steel works. Some vehicles will be adjusted for the needs of the national economy. For example, BMP-1 vehicles which are subjected to dismantlement in February, will be reequipped into fire engines. They will be used for putting out forest and peat bog fires. Universal tractors and cranes will be exploited as well. Or, a "disarmed" tank can compact silage.

Rudenko: If there is be a demand for such vehicles, you could also offer quite a few modifications of military vehicles....

Vakar: But we are bound by the obligations stemming from the treaty. The issue is that the treaty allows us to dismantle only a specific number of vehicles. As for the BMP, I can speak only about 390 vehicles. Besides, all the inner parts of these vehicles which are later used for repair and other practical purposes are taken out before the dismantlement starts.

Rudenko: Disarmament is an expensive undertaking....

Vakar: Of course, I cannot say that it is a profitable business. But we must fulfill all the articles of the treaty. Our international image depends on it. I hope that the military conflicts are over.

Rudenko: The dismantlement of armor, artillery, and missile equipment is under the control of foreign inspectors. Do our military experts take part in such inspections when other countries are dismantling their military equipment?

Vakar: We are usually informed beforehand. As for business trips, we can go on inspections, but we usually stay because our ministry lacks hard currency.

WGF Commander on Pace of Troop Withdrawal From Germany

AU0802110993 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 3 Feb 93 p 2

["H.A." report: "Withdrawal Plan Observed"]

[Text] Berlin—Until today, the timetable for the withdrawal of the troops of the Western Group of the Russian Armed Forces [WGF] has been totally fulfilled. So far, 329,500 persons, 211,356 of whom belong directly to military personnel, have left the country. Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Russian Armed Forces, drew up this interim balance in Berlin on 2 February. By advancing the final withdrawal date by 4 months, not the planned 27 percent, but even 30 percent of the remaining staff will return in 1993, he said.

Burlakov pointed out that there are problems with the Russian Army members' reintegration in their homeland. He reproached the German side for hesitating to finance housing construction in the individual republics. He made the request that the funds budgeted for 1994 be provided as early as in 1993. The commander in chief announced further restrictions of exercises and in the training of the troops. He resolutely rejected rumors voiced in the press about gun and merchandise rackets, in which he was reportedly involved himself. But he admitted individual violations of the customs regulations by members of the Russian Army. In 1992 more than 100 persons were taken to account and 27 were dismissed in commercial institutions. However, Germans and criminal compatriots are crowding around the barracks, he said. Burlakov referred to the increasing number of attacks on members of the Western Group. As a result of these, seven Russians died in 1992; and as many as nine attacks were carried out in January 1993.

Ukraine Arms Sale Possibly Affects CFE Treaty

MK1702095693 Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No 6, 15 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by Igor Sutyagin, Alla Glebova: "No One Has Come to Kharkov Commodity Exchange"]

[Text] On 28 January, weapons worth \$2 billion were put up for sale at the Universal Ukrainian-Siberian Exchange (UUSE) in Kharkov. This made the exchange the target of close scrutiny by Russian and foreign correspondents.

On 11 February, another round of trading took place at the UUSE. The exchange's information bulletin contained 65 types of weapons, but no buyers have yet come forward. An investigation carried out by KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondents throws doubt on the genuineness of the offer. Possibly somebody was making a sincere, but unsuccessful attempt to become a world-class arms merchant. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the Russian secret services are trying to use the UUSE to identify potential intermediaries to engage in illegal arms exports.

According to UUSE deputy director Aleksandr Shlyakhov, correspondents have been plaguing exchange managers with the question: "Whose weapons are they?" Although on 29 January exchange director Yevgeniy Blinkov answered that the firm that had made the offer was "Russian and the goods are in Russia," on 11 February he said he did not know anything about the location of the firm or the weapons. The exchange only records and enters in an information bulletin the offer made by a seller, who remains anonymous and discloses only his telephone number. The exchange places only those clients who meet the arms seller's requirements in direct contact with him. These requirements include the possession of a license to trade in arms, an end-user certificate, documents specifying the place of unloading, and a letter of guarantee from a first-class bank. The seller shows the client the hardware and the documentation and they jointly decide the question of delivery.

The heightened interest in the UUSE arms deal was caused not only by the unprecedented sum involved, but also by the fact that a whole number of weapons systems listed in the exchange bulletin fall under the limitations specified in the Treaty on Conventional Arms and Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which was signed in June 1992 by the NATO member states, the East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and three Transcaucasian republics. Of fundamental importance is the question as to when the arms offered for sale were manufactured—before or after the CFE was signed, i.e. whether or not they may be traded.

The treaty imposes limitations on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers, armored cars, and so forth), artillery systems with calibers of 100 mm and above, and fixed and rotary wing combat aircraft in army service and depots of the signatory states. All excess hardware must be eliminated within 40 months of the treaty's coming into force, and there is certainly no provision allowing the weapons to be sold as a means of eliminating them.

On the contrary, Article VIII of the treaty and the protocols on reduction and reclassification states explicitly: The weapons must be eliminated physically or (within strict and narrow limits) converted so as to be completely unable to function as weapons. It also bans any transfer of weapons outside the area covered by the CFE Treaty, namely Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The only "geographic" condition set by the anonymous seller at the UUSE was that the weapons could not be sold to buyers in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Therefore, not all the weapons up for sale at the exchange may be sold, and in this light the question of their origin becomes especially interesting. There is yet another question: Do these weapons really exist or was this just a feeler put out by somebody wanting to identify potential buyers?

Responding to a question by NEWSWEEK at a press conference on 10 February at the Russian Foreign Ministry press center about the origin of the arms offered at the UUSE, Viktor Glukhikh, chairman of the defense industries committee, said that they were being sold by the Ukrainian Army, and added: "Russian enterprises may also be involved."

If it is assumed that these weapons really do exist, their source could be discovered by analyzing the list of arms and military equipment in the UUSE bulletin that were offered for the 11-12 February trading session. A KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent therefore went to Kharkov to study the list, and an analysis of it shows that there are basically three large groups of arms.

The first group includes weapons manufactured many years ago but which have never been used. The second and third groups comprise, respectively, brand-new hardware and partially used combat equipment.

The first group features such weaponry as rocket and artillery systems that were manufactured in the 1942-1991 period and for the most part have never been operated. They may originate (especially the most out-of-date weapons) from the mobilization depots of the Soviet Army, from where military equipment was to be drawn in the event of war.

Mikhail Maley, Russian presidential adviser on conversion, said in an interview with a KOMMERSANT correspondent that the bulk of such depots in the USSR were located in Belarus and in southwestern parts of Ukraine. He stressed, however, that the exact source of the military hardware could be established only if the manufacturer's serial number of the item was known. Those numbers were registered at the USSR Defense Ministry, and the archives went to Russia.

Experts at the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Organizational Mobilization Department consider it a great piece of commercial luck to be able to sell this equipment, or rather, the items that are authorized for sale. A great deal of it has been stockpiled, and nobody knows what to do with it. They note that out of the 1,300 artillery pieces of various calibers featured in the UUSE bulletin, the only items of real interest are the 1988 issue R-300 operational-tactical missile system, and the Kvadrat and 2K11 Krug mobile antiaircraft missile systems manufactured in 1987.

This does not mean that other, more up-to-date hardware listed in the bulletin is less interesting in itself (especially since its sale is not prohibited by the treaty, either). Yet Mikhail Maley stated emotionally and authoritatively that "the appearance of this equipment in the UUSE bulletin is just a bluff." In other words, according to the Russian presidential adviser, one should not take seriously the offer of selling through the exchange custom-made T-80BV tanks,

Su-27 aircraft, Mi-24 helicopters, S-300V, Tor, and Tunguska antiaircraft missile systems, or BTR-80 armored personnel carriers. "These weapons," Mikhail Maley said, "are made in Russia, where arms export controls are tougher than ever before." The manufacturers agree with Maley in this regard.

A rapid check carried out by the presidential adviser at KOMMERSANT's request confirmed that not a single item out of these armaments went from the manufacturers in the past few weeks, bypassing the Russian export organizations, to be offered for sale at Ukrainian commodity exchanges. Mikhail Maley thus refuted Viktor Glukhikh's vague statement made at the 10 February press conference.

Maley stressed that Russia had a diversified arms trading network (Promeksport, Oboroneksport, Spetsvneshtekhnika, GUKS, Voyentekh), including commodity exchanges. For example, the arms and military equipment listed in the UUSE bulletin are successfully sold at the military section of Nizhniy Novgorod Fair (small-size items are displayed at the Zolotoye Koltso Exchange in the city of Suzdal), while the services offered by the UUSE in finding serious-minded business partners are performed in Russia by the business center of the military-industrial complex that is currently located on the 16th floor of the Moscow city hall building. "Why should we give away our commissions to the Ukrainian exchange?" was Mikhail Maley's rhetorical question.

The presidential adviser also thought that the price of \$15 million that the UUSE was asking for the TOR antiaircraft missile system, manufactured in Udmurtia, was unrealistically low. He said that Oboroneksport had signed a contract for the sale of four such systems at a considerably higher price.

The partly used T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks, MiG-27, Su-17, and Yak-28 aircraft, and Mi-8T helicopters included in the third group actually fall into the category of weapons subject to limitation under the CFE Treaty, and could have been acquired in the amounts shown in the UUSE bulletin only from regular army units. Their sale, therefore, if it takes place (especially to Africa, as the businessmen were planning), would be a violation of the treaty.

In theory, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus can sell the above-mentioned weapons systems subject to the treaty limitations. If again we assume that these weapons really exist, however, then in addition to the arguments that Maley gave against the theory that they are of Russian origin, there is at least one another factor. Last summer, Russian military leaders were saying in the press (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) that the Russian army had an acute shortage of the modern T-72 and T-80 tanks—less than 25 percent of its entire tank fleet. This was because the military districts located in Russia at the time of the Warsaw Pact were home-front areas, and for the most part were last on the list of priorities to receive modern equipment.

As for the troops located in Ukraine and Belarus, which made up the core of those countries' national armies, because of their "advanced location with regard to NATO," they were mostly equipped with modern tanks

that have now become superfluous. The troops in the East European countries that had the most modern weapons in the entire Soviet Army were also partially transferred to these republics.

It is not only the surplus of modern tanks in the Ukrainian army that testifies to the Ukrainian origin of the military hardware. As KOMMERSANT has learned, a week ago the chief of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's commercial center was dismissed.

Yet one cannot ignore the fact that many of the items advertised in the exchange bulletin are either totally unavailable in Ukraine, or else unavailable in the amounts stated, and in practice cannot be delivered there. This means that there may have been no weapons in the first place, which most likely means that it was "a feeler put out by the secret services." If this is so, the arms buyers proved to be equal to the occasion.

A KOMMERSANT correspondent who was in the UUSE on 11 February when the trading session was scheduled to take place did not notice a single buyer. According to UUSE Deputy Director Aleksandr Shlyakhov, the only telephone call to the exchange on that day came from someone who introduced himself as an intermediary for a foreign firm and inquired about tanks, but made no specific offers. This low interest on the part of the buyers must be due to their suspiciousness of the UUSE as a large arms trader. Serious buyers went off to the IDEX-93 international exhibition of arms and military equipment in Abu Dhabi, where on 14 February the modern T-80 tanks produced in Omsk will be demonstrating the firepower of Russian weaponry. KOMMERSANT will report on this exhibition in its next issue.

Russian Diplomat Rejects Latvian Claims on Troop Withdrawal

OW1602161393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1525 GMT 16 Feb 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dimitry Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The statement by the head of the Latvian delegation to the negotiations with Russia, Yanis Dinevich, on the deviation of the Russian delegation from the former position on the date of the withdrawal of troops from Latvia "is devoid of any basis." This is contained in a statement distributed on Tuesday by the head of the state delegation of the Russian Federation to the negotiations with Latvia, Sergey Zotov.

He confirmed Russia's readiness to complete the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1994 if they could reach agreement on a number of related questions. Russia insists, in particular, on granting the troops legal status which would make it possible for them to function normally during the period of withdrawal. Besides, some strategic objects must be left on a temporary basis in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltics, as considered in Moscow, should withdraw the claim for damages for the 1940-1991 period and participate

in the construction of housing for servicemen in the units being withdrawn. Russia also insists on transit guarantees for military goods to Kaliningrad region and a decision on the question of compensation for immovable property left behind by the withdrawing troops.

According to Zotov, the change by the Latvian delegation to cooperate in the settlement of the disputed question would assist the quick conclusion of the corresponding international agreement "the absence of which has led to the suspension of the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics."

Russian Tanks Destroyed Near St. Petersburg Under CFE

LD1702223793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS freelance correspondent Mikhail Fridman]

[Text] St. Petersburg, 17 Feb (ITAR-TASS)—The destruction of tanks provided for by the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] treaty signed by 22 countries began at the Servicing and Engineering [Remontno-Mekhanicheskii] Works outside St. Petersburg today. Almost 3,000 tanks are to be destroyed by the Russian Army.

"An important stage in the planned reduction of conventional weapons in Russia has begun," Major General Anatoliy Naumenko, chief of the Armor Maintenance and Supply Directorate of the Main Armored Troops Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Russia told the ITAR-TASS correspondent. "And although just this one plant is engaged in destroying the tanks, we are to complete the entire volume of this difficult work by October 1995. It will be carried out under the strict control of inspection groups of the treaty's member countries."

The general reported that the first group of 60 vehicles to be destroyed were presented to the foreign inspectors today. After a thorough check, the specialists from six countries gave the "okay" for their destruction. The first group of inspectors was headed by Lieutenant Colonel (George Moolders) of the Royal Army of the Netherlands.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Legal Basis of Mirzayanov Prosecution Questioned

93WC0019A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 93
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Valeriy Rudnev, IZVESTIYA: "'State Criminal' Still Does Not Know What His Crime Is"]

[Text] As soon as the Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons was signed in Paris, lawyer Aleksandr Asnis in Moscow raised the question of dropping the criminal case against Vil Mirzayanov, who was accused by Russian state security in October last year of divulging a state secret concerning the production of military toxic substances. The reason—the change of conditions (meaning the signing of the convention), as a consequence of which V. Mirzayanov could no longer be called socially dangerous.

Investigators of the Ministry of Security of Russia have been conducting a criminal case for three months now against

Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov, a former employee of the State Union of the Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) (IZVESTIYA Nos 234, 239, 240, 243, 247, 250 in 1992). The gist of the charge brought against him is that the scientist, after once signing a statement on not divulging chemical weapons production secrets that he learned of in connection with his service at GSNIIOKhT, violated the rules of the "game" and made state secrets public through the mass media. The Procuracy of Russia arrested V. Mirzayanov, but Judge Aleksandr Shchanin deemed it possible to set the arrest aside in connection with the fact that the accused did not constitute a danger to society. But in the opinion of lawyer A. Asnis, there was no criminal character at all in Mirzayanov's actions.

The dramatis personae of this criminal story—from the standpoint of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation—are well known. It is also not necessary to establish the facts; they have been published in the newspapers. Why then is the investigation still being dragged on, although its term according to the law is only two months?

Viktor Shkarin, a state security investigator, declined to answer this question, but noted: If the procurator general extended the period of the investigation in the case to four months, it means that there are good reasons for this. In his opinion, much will depend on a commission of experts, to whom he posed the question: Do the facts divulged by the accused fall within the scope of information constituting a state secret? The investigator himself cannot answer this question—by reason of his own lack of competence. Therefore, he, V. Shkarin, entrusted the expert analysis to those with special knowledge in this field—workers of the chemical industry (read military-chemical complex)—who are engaged in guaranteeing the secrecy of developments in the field of chemical weapons.

Lawyer Aleksandr Asnis, on the contrary, believes: The appointment of such an expert commission contradicts the requirements of criminal procedural legislation, inasmuch as the expert commission is being asked to resolve legal questions, resolution of which is exclusively within the competence of the investigator.

In the opinion of the defense, the only questions that should be submitted for resolution by experts should go like this: Did Mirzayanov's divulgence of the information harm the defense capability of state security and the economic potential and political interests of Russia? After all, the very existence of a state secret, the lawyer explains, can be disclosed by the secure safeguarding itself of the aforementioned interests of the country.

Thus, two approaches have emerged. The investigation puts formal indications at the forefront—the secret list of data that make up a state secret, which was put into effect by a secret decree of the USSR Council of Ministers as long ago as 1987. (In passing, we note that the list itself, and the Council of Ministers decree, and many other "secret" and still unpublished normative acts that restrict the freedoms of citizens, according to the conclusion of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on Human

Rights, contradict today's Constitution of Russia and international legal acts. Just like the edict of the president of Russia, which allows the temporary use of secret decisions of the former USSR. However, this is a subject that is more for the Constitutional Court, to which A. Asnis intends to turn, rather than to a public discussion in the press.) The defense insists on a resolution of the dispute through the use of qualitative criteria, where the first question is: Does the information divulged by V. Mirzayanov harbor a threat to the state interests of Russia today? It is this that conditions the choice of experts of the disputing parties. For the investigation, they are specialists of the military-chemical complex and the authors of the classified list in the area of chemical weapons development. For the defense, independent of the military-chemical complex, they are: Academician Georgiy Arbatov, General Oleg Kalugin, and Colonel Petr Nikulin. The last is deputy chief of the Scientific Research Institute for Security Problems of the Ministry of Security of Russia, a specialist in the field of information security, and one of the developers of the draft law "On State Secrets," which was prepared in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.

But there was no argument on the composition of experts. The investigator refused to satisfy the petition of the defense on including the aforementioned specialists on the staff of the expert commission. Academician G. Arbatov did not suit the investigation, because he had already expressed his point of view on this question in the press, "by which he displayed a personal interest in the outcome of the case." The others, in the opinion of V. Shkarin, were simply incompetent.

The lawyer considers the refusal to satisfy his petition illegal, which is indicative of the reluctance of the investigation to look into the facts of the case objectively, thoroughly, and fully, as is required by law. He intends to appeal the decision of the investigator with the procurator general of Russia. However, nothing much is expected from the procurators. Until now the investigating official has declined virtually all the petitions of the defendant and the counsel for the defense, and the procuracy has responded to their complaints in typical fashion—"we do not see any violation of the law."

And one more fact, apparently, is impeding the investigation. Earlier, after V. Mirzayanov made his signed statement on nondivulgence of secrets concerning the production of combat toxic agents, he was obliged to remain silent, which, however, did not curtail his desire to tell people the truth about the mortal danger that was lying in wait for them. But now, in the position of a defendant, he—in contrast, let us say, to his own lawyer, who made a signed statement, in his turn, on the nondivulgence of a secret of the preliminary investigation—is not restricted by any kind of obligations. And he can publicly relate the materials of the criminal case in full. In other words, V. Mirzayanov can continue to expose the military-chemical complex, now basing himself on the documents of the investigation. Apparently it is for this reason that the chemical scientist is not being familiarized with the secret normative acts on whose basis criminal proceedings are being instituted against him.

On 12 January 1993 V. Mirzayanov gave investigator V. Shkarin an official statement in which he indicated: In connection with the systematic violation of his rights to a defense, he declares a resolute protest and is ending his participation in investigative actions. At the same time, the defendant explained that, although he will appear as required by the investigation, he refuses to answer any kind of questions.

In a word, there is an impasse. The investigator is trying to conduct a case in secrecy from the defendant, and the defendant refuses to answer the questions of the investigation. What is the solution?

The lawyer believes that if the investigation does not have the courage to stop the criminal case for lack of corpus delicti, then after the signing in Paris of the convention on chemical weapons, the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation will make a compromise move—stop the case on the basis of Article 6 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]; i.e., as a result of the change in the situation. The defendant himself hopes for the attention and help of President Boris Yeltsin, to whom he has sent a letter. And investigator Viktor Shkarin answered evasively on the outlook for the case: Anything is possible...

Emigre Scientist Charges Continuing Russian BW Work

93P50056A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 26 Jan 93 p 2

[M. Shch. report: "After Mirzayanov, Pasechnik"]

[Text] After the disclosures by V. Mirzayanov, who revealed that work in Russia on new types of chemical weapons had

not been stopped, information has appeared that, behind a curtain of secrecy, military specialists have not ceased their attempts to perfect biological weapons [BW]. Thus, emigre scientist V. Pasechnik, a biologist who says he worked in defense, declared on British television that to his knowledge work is continuing on the creation of "effective" strains of germs for the most horrible diseases, including bubonic plague. It is considered that such things may become the preferred weapons for groups of terrorists. In the words of the scientist, "who chose freedom," he left his own fatherland to expose this secret research.

Now it is necessary elucidate: What is this—is it really an expose or an attempt by the "refugee" to excite interest in the West in his own unimposing person? In any case, his statement has attracted serious attention.

Russia To Completely Destroy Chemical Weapons by 2005

LD1502201593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
1700 GMT 15 Feb 93

[Text] In the near future three facilities for destroying chemical weapons will be set up in Russia. This was stated by Igor Vlasov, head of a department of the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons. According to him the Khimprom association in Novocheboksarsk will be reconfigured and used for these purposes, and two facilities will also be built in the Saratov oblast and Udmurtia for the destruction and utilization of the mustard gas-lewisite mixtures.

Igor Vlasov noted that the complete destruction of chemical weapons will be finished by the year 2005. Over 3 billion rubles and \$543 million have been allotted for this purpose.

GERMANY

Report Details Planned European, U.S. Troop Cuts

AU1102115293 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Feb 93 p 3

[Report by Karl Feldmeyer: "Major Cuts Beginning To Take Place in NATO"]

[Text] Bonn, 10 Feb—Until last year, disarmament in Europe was a subject of international negotiations and treaties. For 16 years, the NATO states had unsuccessfully conducted the so-called MBFR [Mutual Balanced Force Reduction] talks with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states. Only after Gorbachev had come to power in Moscow did it become possible to achieve progress in new disarmament talks in Vienna. That is how the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was concluded. It has established certain ceilings for the number of fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery pieces, battle tanks, and armored vehicles in each country. A subsequent round of negotiations discussed the so-called CFE IA Treaty, which set ceilings on the strength of personnel of the armed forces. On 30 June 1992, these talks were successfully concluded at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki. In the treaty, the signatory countries commit themselves to achieve the lower ceilings by the end of 1994.

These efforts have become politically outdated at least in the western part of Europe. After the end of the East-West conflict and the disappearance of the feeling of military threat from the East, almost all Western states want to reduce arms even more than they are obliged to under the treaty. The Federal Government now wants to take advantage of this fact to justify its decision to reduce the Bundeswehr to a level below 370,000 soldiers. The government is obviously hoping that it can thus counter the unpleasant impression that the size of the Bundeswehr is not determined by requirements in terms of security policy but by the acute financial constraints. Both in this week's coalition round and in the meeting of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]/Christian Social Union [CSU] Bundestag Group, the chancellor would come up with this argument. The government will this year decide on the strength of Bundeswehr personnel after 1995. At the moment, the strength of the armed forces is still 420,000 men. Germany committed itself to reducing them to 370,000 men by the end of 1994. Subsequently, the armed forces are to be given one year of "respite" to consolidate before further disarmament steps are taken.

Among Germany's European allies, the decisionmaking process on the size and the structure of the armed forces has not yet concluded. A comparison shows that individual states are acting differently. A drastic reduction of the armed forces is taking place in Belgium. Only about 40,000 soldiers are to remain of the currently somewhat less than

80,000 men by the end of next year. 3,000 should remain stationed in Germany. The halving of the armed forces will go hand in hand with abolishing compulsory military service. After 1994, Belgium will have a professional army. The Netherlands is pursuing a similar course. The armed forces there are to be reduced from the current 70,000 to 39,000 soldiers, with 3,500 men remaining in Germany. The Netherlands will also abolish compulsory military service. It is to be phased out in 1998 and replaced by a professional army.

France will also considerably cut its armed forces—from 420,000 to 350,000 after 1994. Units involving 18,000 men are to remain stationed in Germany. The French parties are not considering abolishing compulsory military service, even though our neighbors are publicly discussing the issue of a professional army. Britain settled the debate on compulsory military service many years ago. London is planning to reduce its professional army from 300,000 to somewhat more than 250,000 men in the second half of the decade, and planning to leave a total of 30,000 men in Germany.

Changes regarding the armed forces will be less significant in the case of our southern European allies. Turkey is planning to cut its army from 585,000 to 365,000 men, while Greece will reduce from 200,000 to 125,000 soldiers, and Italy from 322,000 to 290,000—but abandoning compulsory military service is not on the agenda in any of these countries. On the Iberian peninsula, the situation is different. Spain is discussing whether, once the armed forces are reduced by more than 100,000 men from 275,000 to 170,000 soldiers, obligatory military service should not be replaced by a professional army. In Portugal this is meanwhile even regarded as likely. The armed forces there are to be reduced from 73,000 to 30,000.

In northern Europe, the armed forces of NATO partners Denmark and Norway have been of a size that even anticipated detente. The planned cuts are, therefore, insignificant. Denmark will reduce its forces from 29,600 to 28,000 men, Norway from 36,700 to 35,900. Both states have organized their armed forces in a way that links compulsory military service with structures of a militia army. This will not change.

How many soldiers the United States will keep in Europe and thus mainly in Germany has not yet been decided. The new defense secretary, Aspin, is planning to reduce the total size of U.S. Armed Forces to 1.4 million men, a larger cut than originally planned. It is currently expected that between 75,000 and 100,000 U.S. troops will remain in Europe even after 1994, and of this, two divisions and one corps staff, as well as one Air Force squadron will remain deployed in Germany. The Canadian Armed Forces, which had hitherto stationed 5,000 soldiers in Europe, have already withdrawn their troops. All these measures will reduce the combat-ready armed forces in the West European NATO states from more than 2.5 million to about 1.9 million men.

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